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1. INTRODUCTION
This Article tells the story behind the Supreme Court's 1978 decision
in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation.' Using
interviews with participants, documents from the case, and papers of some
of the Justices who heard the appeal,2 it explains how a single letter
complaining about "dirty words" in a comedy routine broadcast by a radio
station ended up in the Supreme Court. It also relates how a closely divided
1. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
2. All of Justice Blackmun's papers cited in this article are from Box 274, Harry A.
Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. [hereinafter
Blackmun Papers]. All of Justice Powell's papers cited in this article are from Box 198,
Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers, 1921-1998, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington and Lee
University, Lexington, VA [hereinafter Powell Papers]. Justice Marshall's papers may be
found in Box 215, Thurgood Marshall Papers, Supreme Court File, 1967-1991, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Marshall Papers].
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Court found the FCC's admonishment of the radio station to be
constitutional even though the broadcast was protected by the First
Amendment and its distribution by other means could not be prohibited.
The Pacifica case was controversial when it was decided in 1978. It
became even more controversial during the George W. Bush administration
when the FCC stepped up its enforcement of restrictions on indecent
speech. Two FCC enforcement actions have come before the Supreme
Court. In the Fox case, 3 the FCC admonished Fox Television for
broadcasting "fleeting expletives." In the CBS case,4 the FCC fined CBS
over a half-million dollars for the brief exposure of Janet Jackson's breast
during a Super Bowl halftime show.
In both cases, the networks argued, among other things, that the
FCs action violated the First Amendment and that Pacifica should be
overturned. The Court remanded both cases without addressing the
constitutional claims. This Article is timely because the Court may consider
the soundness of Pacificawhen it reviews the decisions on remand.
Part I describes the state of the law before Pacifica. Part 11 describes
the FCC's decisions in Pacifica, and Part III discusses the D.C. Circuit's
opinion reversing the FCC. Part [V describes the progress of the case in the
Supreme Court, from the decision to grant certiorari to the five-to-four
decision to reverse the D.C. Circuit and uphold the FCC. Part V discusses
the contemporary reaction to the Pacifica decision, while Part VI
summarizes the FCC's enforcement of the prohibition against broadcasting
indecent material after Pacfica. Part VII describes the Supreme Court's
decision in Fox and the decision of the Second Circuit on remand. Part VIII
concludes by reflecting on the implications of this reassessment of Pacifica
for these later indecency cases.
11. THE STATE OF THE LAW BEFORE PA CIFICA
Although Pacifica is usually studied as a First Amendment case, it
also resolved important statutory questions about the meaning of § 1464 of
the Criminal Code, which prohibits the broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or
profane language"; 5 the FCC' s authority to enforce § 1464; and the
anticensorship provision in section 326 of the Communications Act.

3. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1800
(2009), vacated, 2010 WL 2736937 (2d Cir. Jul. 13, 2010).
4. CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 172 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2176
(2009).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.").
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The Statutory Scheme

Both § 1464 of the Criminal Code and section 326 of the
Communications Act originated in the Radio Act of 1927, which created
the Federal Radio Commission to license radio stations in the public
interest.6 Section 29 of that Act read:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the
licensing authority the power of censorship over the radio
communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the licensing
authority which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means
of radio communications. No person within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall utter any obscene,
indecent, or profane language by
7
means of radio communication.
This language was reenacted in section 326 of the Communications
Act of 19348 In 1948, the Criminal Code was revised, and the last sentence
of section 326 was moved to Title 18 of the Criminal Code to join other
federal criminal statutes regulating offensive matter. 9 This revision made
the Department of Justice (130J) responsible for criminal enforcement of §
146410 It was unclear whether this change was intended to remove the
FC's authority to enforce § 1464 administratively, since other sections of
the Communications Act seemed to give the FCC authority to impose
various sanctions for violations of § 1464.11 The Court resolved this
uncertainty in Pacifica and concluded that rearranging the provisions did
not limit the FCC's authority to impose sanctions on licensees for
broadcasting indecent material.1 "

B.

Enforcement of Section 1464 Priorto Pacifica
In practice, neither the DOJ nor the FCC actively enforced § 1464

6. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1172-73 (1927).

7. Id. § 29.
8. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 326, 48 Stat. 1064, 1091
(codified as amended at scattered sections 47 U.S.C.).
9. Criminal Code of 1948, ch. 645, § 1464, 62 Stat. 769, 866 (1948). For example, §
1461 prohibits the mailing of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book ...
or other
publication of an indecent character..."Id. § 146 1.
10. Ann-Ellen Marcus, Casenote, Broadcasting Seven Dirty Words, 20 B.C. L. REV.
975, 983, 988 (1979).
11. These sanctions included monetary forfeitures, fines, and revocation of licenses. Id
at 985-8 7.
12. FCC v. P'acifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978). The Court interpreted § 326's
anticensorship provision as denying the "[FCC] any power to edit proposed broadcasts in
advance and to excise material considered inappropriate for the airwaves" but not "the
power to review the content of completed broadcasts in the performance of its regulatory
duties." Id at 735.
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prior to 1970. 13 In 1969, the Senate Subcommittee on Communications
held a hearing and strongly suggested that the FCC do more to curb
offensive broadcasting. 14 This hearing was prompted, at least in part, by the
Subcommittee's unhappiness with the FCC's grant of an additional license
to the Pacifica Foundation despite the large number of complaints about its
5

programming.'1
Shortly after the hearing, the FCC issued a Notice of Apparent
Liability (NAL) for violating § 1464 against WULHY-FM, a noncommercial
station in Philadelphia.'16 WUJHY-FM had broadcast a fifty-minute, taped
interview with the Grateful Dead's Jerry Garcia at 10:00 p.m. in which
Garcia repeatedly used the words "fulk and "shit."'" The FCC explained
that the issue was not whether the station could present Garcia' s views, but:
whether the licensee may present previously taped interview or talk
shows where the persons intersperse or begin their speech with
expressions like, "S - - t, man . . .", ".
900 f- - -- n' times", .. . right f ---

and s - - t like that"', or
gout of ya", etc.

. .

We believe . .. we have a duty to act to prevent the widespread use
on broadcast outlets of such expressions ... For, the speech involved
has no redeeming social value, and is patently offensive by
contemporary community standards . . . [I]t conveys no thought to
as an
. . ", or to use 'Tf--g"
begin some speech with "S - - t, man.
8
adjective throughout the speech.'1
The FCC found that the broadcast was not "obscene" under § 1464
because it did not appeal to the prurient interest.' 9 However, it concluded
that "the statutory term, 'indecent', should be applicable, and that, in the
broadcast field, the standard for its applicability should be that the material
broadcast is (a) patently offensive by contemporary community standards;
and (b) is utterly without redeeming social value.",20 The decision cited no
authority for this assertion, and indeed, recognized that there was no
applicable judicial or administrative precedent .2 ' The FCC imposed a one-

13. Marcus, supra note 10, at 983. The FCC referred complaints about obscene or
indecent programming to the 130J, and imposed civil sanctions only after a successful
prosecution by the DOJ or a determination by the DOJ that the offense was prosecutable.
The DOJ rarely acted on such complaints. Id at 983 n.77 (noting that DOJ brought only five
prosecutions against broadcasters under § 1464).
14. Proposed Amendment to the Communications Act of 1934: Hearings on S. 2004
Before the S. Subcomm. on Comm., 91 st Cong., 343-74 (1969).
15. Marcus, supra note 10 at 987 n.93.
16. WUI{Y-FM Eastern Education Radio, Notice of Apparent Liability, 24 F.C.C.2d
408 (1970).
17. Id. at para. 3.
18. Id. at paras. 6-7.
19. Id. at para. 10.
20. Id.
21. Id at para. 11.
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hundred-dollar fine and stated that it welcomed judicial review. 2 Despite
WIJHY-FM did not appeal.2
this invitation and strong dissents,
Undoubtedly, it would have cost far more to appeal than to pay the fine.
Henry Geller, who served as a special assistant to the Republican
FCC Chairman Dean Burch at the time of the WUHY case, explained why
the FCC brought this case. The Chairman wanted this type of language off
the air. Geller advised him that the broadcast did not violate § 1464
because it was not obscene. He suggested that Burch use the "raised
eyebrow" approach, but Burch did not want to do that. Geller then
suggested arguing that indecent speech differed from obscene speech under
the statute. Even though Geller thought the FCC would lose in court, Burch
wanted it done under the statute, and Geller thought he had no other choice
but to follow Burch's wishes. 2
The next FCC case enforcing § 1464 involved a commercial radio
format known as "topless radio."2 6 This term refers to call-in shows,
typically aired midday, which include explicit discussions of sex .2 ' After
receiving complaints about this format, the FCC issued a NAL in April
1973, proposing to fine Sonderling Broadcasting Corporation, licensee of
WGLD-FM in Oak Park, Illinois, two thousand dollars for broadcasting
"obscene and indecent" matter in violation of § 1464.2
Like WUHY, Sonderling paid the fine rather than incur the expense
of an appeal .29 However, the Illinois Citizens for Broadcasting and the
Illinois Division of the ACLU filed a petition alleging that the FCC's
actions had deprived listeners of their First Amendment rights to hear
constitutionally protected programming. 30 The FCC denied the petition, and
the petitioners appealed to the D.C. Circuit .31 The FCC Associate General
22. Id. at para. 16.
23. Commissioner Nicholas Johnson dissented, accusing the majority of condemning "a
culture-a lifestyle it fears because it does not understand." and "simply ignor[ing] decades
of First Amendment law . . .. What the Commission tells the broadcaster he cannot say is
anyone's guess-and therein lies the constitutional deficiency." Id. at 422 (Johnson,
dissenting). Commissioner Kenneth A. Cox dissented in part because he thought the
Commission had exaggerated the problem way out of proportion. Id. at 417-18 (Cox,
dissenting in part).
24. Marcus, supra note 10, at 986-87.
25. Interview with Henry Geller, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 20, 2008) [hereinafter
Geller Interview].
26. Sonderling Brdcst. Corp., WGLD-FM, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 41
F.C.C. 2d 777 (1973).
27. Id at para. 5.
28. Id. at para. 1.
29. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Brdcst. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
reh'g denied, 515 F.2d at 407 (1975) (per curiam).
3 0. Id.
3 1. Id.at400-0 1.
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Counsel, Joseph A. Marino, who would later argue the Pacifica case in the

Supreme Court, argued this case in the D.C.

Circuit. 32

The court affirmed

the FCC in a decision written by Judge Leventhal, who agreed that the
broadcasts were obscene and that the sanction did not violate the First
Amendment.3
In Sonderling, "[tlhe FCC found [the] broadcasts obscene under the
standards of Roth v. United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts." 3 4 While
the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court formulated new obscenity
standards in Miller v. California.3 1 Miller did not address whether indecent
speech should be assessed using the same standard as obscenity. This
question came to the fore in Pacifica.
III. THE FCC DECISION IN PACIFICA
On December 3, 1973, the FCC received a letter dated November 28,
from John H. Douglas, 385 Madison Avenue, New York, NY. The entire
letter stated as follows:
On October 3 0O', in the early afternoon (from approximately 1:30 to
2:30 p.m.,) while driving in my car, I tuned to radio station WBAI in
New York City.
I heard, among other obscenities, the following words: cocksucker,
fluck, cunt, shit, and a whole host of others. This was supposed to be
part of a comedy monologue.
Whereas I can perhaps understand an "X-rated" phonograph record's
being sold for private use, I certainly cannot understand the broadcast
of same over the air that, supposedly, you control. Any child could
have been turning the dial, and tuned in to that garbage.
Some time back, I read that "topless" radio stations were fined for
suggestive phrases. If you fine for suggestions, should not this station
lose its license entirely for such blatant disregard for the public
ownership of the airwaves?
32. Id at 400. Marino also argued FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 728 (1978).
33. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 515 F.2d at 404. Judge Leventhal explained
that the "excerpts cited by the Commission contain repeated and explicit descriptions of the
techniques of oral sex" presented "in a context that was fairly described by the FCC as
'titillating and pandering."' Moreover, they were broadcast from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.
"when the radio audience may include children-perhaps home from school for lunch, or
because of staggered school hours or illness." Id. The citizens groups unsuccessfully sought
rehearing en banc. Id at 408 (per curiam order denying en banc rehearing). Judge Bazelon,
the only one who voted for rehearing, issued a lengthy statement explaining his vote. Id at
407-25.
34. Id at 404 (citations omitted).
35. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1972). The new standard had three parts: "(a)
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . ; (b) whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value." Id at 24 (citations omitted).
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Can you say this is a responsible radio station, that demonstrates a
responsibility to the public for its license?
I'd like to know, gentlemen, just what you 're going to do about this
outrage, and by copy, I'm asking our elected officials the same thing.
Incidentally, my young son was with me when I heard the above, and
unfortunately, he can corroborate what was heard.3
Although the letter does not state the age of his son, Douglas later told
37
Broadcastingmagazine that he was fifteen at the time.

The FCC forwarded the complaint to Pacifica. Pacifica responded:
Mr. Douglas' complaint is based upon the language used in a satirical
monologue broadcast of a regularly scheduled live program
"Lunchpail," hosted by Paul Gorman. The selection was broadcast as
part of a discussion about the use of language in society. The
monologue in question was from the album, "George Carlin,
Occupation: FOOLE," .
On October 30, the "Lunchpail" program
consisted of Mr. Gorman's commentary as well as analysis of
contemporary society's attitudes toward language. . . . Mr. Gorman
played the George Carlin segment as it keyed into a general discussion
of the use of language in our society.
The selection from the Carlin album was broadcast towards the end
of the program because it was regarded as an incisive satirical view of
the subject under discussion. Immediately prior to the broadcast of the
monologue, listeners were advised that it included sensitive language
which might be regarded as offensive to some; those who might be
offended were advised to change the station and retumn to WBAI in 15
minutes.... To our knowledge, Mr. Douglas is the only person who
has complained about either the program or the George Carlin
monologue....
George Carlin is a significant social satirist of American manners and
language in the tradition of Mark Twain and Mort Sahl. . . .Carlin, like
Twain and Sahl before him, examines the language of ordinary people.
In the selection broadcast from his album, he shows us that words
which most people use at one time or another cannot be threatening or
obscene. Carlin is not mouthing obscenities, he is merely using words
..

36. The letter is reproduced in the Appendix to the Brief of Petitioner FCC at 2-3, FCC
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (No. 77-528). Douglas was a planning board member of
Morality in Media. R. Wilfred Tremblay, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, in'FREE SPEECH ON
TRIAL 219 (Richard A. Parker ed., 2003). Morality in Media's amicus brief described

Morality in Media as
[A] New York not for profit inter-faith charitable Corporation, organized in 1968
for the purpose of combating the distribution of obscene material in the United
States. This organization, now national in scope, has affiliates in six states. It
corresponds 8 times a year with over 50,000 recipients of its newsletter located in
every state of the United States. Its Board of Directors and National Advisory
Board are composed of prominent businessman, clergy and civic leaders.
Brief for Morality in Media as Amicus Curiae Supporting the FCC at 2, FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-528).
37. WRAI Ruling: Supreme Court Saves the Worst for the Last, BROADCASTING, July
10, 1978, at 20.
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to satirize as harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards those
words.
[T]he inclusion of the material broadcast in a program devoted to an
analysis of the use of language in contemporary society' was natural
and contributed to a further understanding on the subject. 1
Instead of issuing an NAL as it did in Eastern Education and
Sonderling, the FCC issued a declaratory order .39 According to Marino, an
investigator in the Broadcast Bureau originally drafted a "boilerplate"
forfeiture notice on grounds that the program was both obscene and
40
indecent . Marino knew that in a prior case, Judge Leventhal had
expressed concern that the FCC's use of forfeitures pre-judged
culpability. 4 1

He took a copy of the Carlin transcript home to his wife.42

She read it and started laughing.4 At that point, he knew that the FCC
could not successfully prove the monologue was obscene."4 Thus, he and
others at the FCC drafted a declaratory order for the FCC's consideration.
A.

The FCC's Declaratory Order

The Declaratory Order recognized that section 326 of the
Communications Act prohibited the FCC from engaging in censorship, but
noted that the FCC also had an obligation to enforce § 1464. While the
Declaratory Order claimed it was "not intended to modify our previous
decisions recognizing broadcasters' broad discretion in the programming
area," it asserted that the broadcast medium had "special qualities" that
distinguished it from other forms of expression and was, therefore, subject
to a different mode of analysis.4 Specifically, it found that:
Broadcasting requires special treatment because . .. (1) children have
access to radios and in many cases are unsupervised by parents; (2)
radio receivers are in the home, a place where people's privacy interest
is entitled to extra deference . .. ; (3) unconsenting adults may tune in
a station without any warning that offensive language is being or will
be broadcast; and (4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of
38. The letter is reproduced in the Appendix to the Brief of Petitioner FCC at 3-4,
Pacfica,438 U.S. 726 (No. 77-52 8).
39. Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975) [hereinafter DeclaratoryOrder].
40. Telephone Interview with Joseph Marino (Oct. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Marino
Interview].
41. See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Brdcst. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
("The procedure used by the FCC in issuing the Notice of Apparent Liability raises
questions with regard to the rights of the licensee. First, it includes terms of conclusions,
while the statute contemplates only charges.").
42. Marino Interview, supra note 40.
43. Id.

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. DeclaratoryOrder, supra note 39, at paras. 7-8.
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47
which the government must therefore license in the public interest.
The Declaratory Order acknowledged that "the term 'indecent' ha[d]
never been authoritatively construed by the Courts in connection with §
14 6 4 .*,A' In light of the Miller and Illinois Citizens decisions, the FCC
decided to "reformulat[e] the concept of 'indecent."A 9 It concluded that
"patently offensive language, such as that involved in the Carlin broadcast,
should be governed by principles which are analogous to those found in
cases relating to public nuisance" and thus, should be channeled to a more
appropriate time rather than prohibited all together. 50 The FCC suggested
that a more lenient definition of "indecent" would be appropriate during
5
"late evening hours" when few children would be in the audience. '
Applying these considerations to WBAI's broadcast of the Carlin
monologue, the FCC concluded that the language was indecent and
prohibited by § 1464 because:
as
"fuck," "1shit," "piss," "motherfucker,"
such
[W']ords
"cocksucker," "cunt" and "tit" depict sexual and excretory activities
and organs in a manner patently offensive by contemporary
community standards . . . and are accordingly "indecent" when
broadcast on radio or television. These words were broadcast at a time
when children were undoubtedly in the audience (i.e., in the early
afternoon). Moreover, the pre-recorded langua 2e with the words
repeated over and over was deliberately broadcast.
The FCC also explained its decision to issue a declaratory order
instead of an NAL:

A declaratory order is a flexible procedural device admirably suited to
terminate the present controversy between a listener and the station,
and to clarify the standards which the Commission utilizes to judge
"indecent language." Such an order will permit all persons who
consider themselves aggrieved or who wish to call additional factors to
the Commission' s attention to seek reconsideration. If not satisfied by
the Commission's action on reconsideration, judicial review may be
sought immediately.5 3
Although the FCC imposed no fine, it said that if subsequent complaints
were received, it would take them into account at license renewal 5.
At that time, the FCC had seven Commissioners-four Republicans
and three Democrats. The FCC Chairman, Richard E. Wiley, a Republican,

47. Id. at para.
48. Id. at para.
49. Id.
50. Id.at para.
51. Id. at para.
52. Id. at para.
53. Id. at para.
54. Id. at para.

9.
10.
11.
12.
14.
15 (citations omitted).
14.
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Two Commissioners, Charlotte Reid and James

Quello, issued concurring statements indicating that they believed that the
broadcast of the language used in the Carlin monologue would be
inappropriate at any time.5 Commissioner James Quello explained that he
disagreed with the majority's view that "such words are less offensive
when children are at a minimum in the audience. Garbage is garbage. And
under no stretch of the imagination can I conceive of such words being
broadcast in the context of serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific

value.",57

Commissioner Glen Robinson considered the First Amendment
concerns at greater length in his concurring opinion, which was joined by
Commissioner Ben Hooks.5 8 But he ultimately concluded that the FCC
could regulate offensive speech to the extent it constituted a public
nuisance and that the FCC's decision represented a reasonable balance
between the conflicting right of free speech and the right to have some
protection from the undesired speech of others.5 9
B.

The Purpose of Using a DeclaratoryOrder

Several contemporaneous and subsequent events emphasize that the
FCC intended the Order to have a broad application and to serve as a test
case for its new interpretation of indecency.
Around the same time it issued the DeclaratoryOrder, the FCC sent
to Congress its Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene
Material.60 The Violence Report discussed how despite the FCC's
enforcement actions in Eastern Educational Radio and Sonderling, it was
''apparent . .. that particularly on radio the problem of 'indecent' language
has not abated and that the standards set forth in prior opinions has [sic]
failed to resolve the problem.",6 ' The FCC expressed hope that its recently
55. Marino was stunned that Wiley concurred. Marino Interview, supra note 40.
However, Wiley did not remember concurring or why he would have done so. He said that
he rarely wrote separate opinions when he was FCC Chairman because he felt that the FCC
opinion spoke for him. He told me he supported the FCC's action at the time and still
believes it was correct today. Telephone Interview with Richard E. Wiley, Former
Chairman, FCC (July 24, 2009) [hereinafter Wiley Interview].
56. See Declaratory Order, supra note 39, at 102 (Reid, concurring); id. at 102-03
(Quello, concurring).
57. Id. at 103. Quello filed an amicus brief in Fox, along with others agreeing with the
Second Circuit that the FCC acted arbitrarily and in violation of the First Amendment. Brief
of Former FCC Commissioners and Officials as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
FCC v. Fox TV Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2008) (No. 07-582).
58. DeclaratoryOrder, supra note 39, at 103-07 (Robinson, concurring).
59. Id at 107.
60. Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d
418 (1975) [hereinafter Violence Report].
6 1. Id. at42 5.
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issued Declaratory Order in Pacifica would "clarify the broadcast
standards for obscene and indecent speech...
In an interview with WBAI radio after the Supreme Court decision,
then-former Chairman Wiley explained that the FCC had to enforce § 1464
but was not clear on the difference between obscenity and indecency. 63 The
FCC had no position, but wanted finality more than anything else.6 He
noted that the FCC almost invited judicial review. 65 He thought that the
FCC was uncomfortable in this area because of the First Amendment and
wanted to know whether the FC's responsibility extended beyond
hardcore obscenity.6 He noted that most broadcasters would not have used
such language and that it was "too bad" that WBAI had not acted more
67
responsibly.
Commissioner Washburn confirmed in a 1979 speech that the FCC
intentionally chose to issue the DeclaratoryOrder to Pacifica to establish
standards for "indecency." He explained that:
When the "Seven Dirty Words" case reached us,. ...[ojur dilemma
was how to handle this and other complaints being received by the
Broadcast Bureau about indecent language over the air. Congress

mandated the FCC and the Department of Justice to enforce Section
1464. ...
But, unlike "obscenity," in the area of "indecency" we had no
legal guidelines or definitions. We were searching for a way to meet

the statute.
The offensive speech, in the Pacifica complaint,

was not
"obscene" within the appeal-to-the-prurient standard of the Supreme
.

Court. Our General Counsel at that time, Ashton Hardy, advised that. .
it was doubtful the Commission would ever see a stronger case on
which to establish FCC policy on what constitutes indecent speech
within 1464 and to invite judicial review thereofI . . . I recall
[Commissioner] Bob Lee saying at the time, "We need direction from
the Court. .
Our purpose, thus, was to clarify Commission authority. It was not
our intention to penalize Pacifica Station WBAI, because the legal
meaning of "indecent" was then so vague.6

62. Id. The FCC attached a copy of the DeclaratoryOrder to the Violence Report. Id. at
430 app. E.
63. The Carlin Case: Interviews by Joey Cuomo & Mickey Waldman (WBAI radio
broadcast Mar. 30, 1978), available at http://pacificaradioarchives.org/browse/
recording.php?recid=296&catid=3.
64. Id.
6 5. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.

68. Abbott Washburn, FCC Commissioner, Luncheon Address Before the Federal
Communications Bar Association, Washington, D.C.: Indecency and the Law in
Broadcasting (Mar. 7, 1979) [hereinafter Washburn Speech]. Commissioner Washburn sent
a copy of this speech to Justice Blackmun, who filed it in the Pacifica case files.

Number 1]

C.

Number 1]PACIFICA
RECONSIDERED20

207

Reconsideration and Review

Under the Communications Act, a person aggrieved by an FCC action
may appeal the decision directly to a United States Court of Appeals,
except in two situations: where the person (1) was not a party to the
proceeding below, or (2) was a party, but intends to raise facts or
arguments that had not been presented to the FCC. 69 In those situations, the
person must seek reconsideration at the FCC before seeking judicial
review . 70 Even though the FCC invited persons aggrieved to file petitions
for reconsideration and to subsequently seek judicial review, only one party
took up this invitation. The Radio Television News Directors Association
(RTNDA) filed a petition for clarification seeking a ruling that the FCC
"'does not intend to apply its definition of indecent language so as to
prohibit the broadcasting of indecent words which might otherwise be
7
reported as a part of a bona fide news or public affairs program."', '
Pacifica opted to seek immediate judicial review in the D.C. Circuit.
In its brief, Pacifica emphasized the relationship between the Declaratory
Order and the Report to Congress:
Although the Order was issued by way of response to a listener
complaint, the Order itself is not limited to the facts of the specific
complaint. Rather, it was issued in conjunction with, and as an integral
part of, the Commission 's Report on the Broadcast of Violent,
Indecent, and Obscene Material...which [it] submitted to 72
Congress
on February 19, 1975, in response to Congressional directives.

Pacifica further argued that while the DeclaratoryOrder referred to
patently offensive language, which describes sexual or excretory activities
73
and organs, the sweep of the Order is much broader. 1
[U]nder the [FCC's] definition of 'indecent' any and all uses of certain
words which . . . refer in a patently offensive manner to sexual or
excretory functions or organs are banned whether such words, as
actually used in context, describe sexual or excretory activities or
organs or whether they are used colloquially in contexts where they
69. 47 U.S.C. § 405(a) (2006).
The filing of a petition for reconsideration shall not be a condition precedent to
judicial review of any such order, decision, report, or action, except where the
party seeking such review (1) was not a party to the proceedings resulting in such
order, decision, report, or action, or (2) relies on questions of fact or law upon
which the Commission, or designated authority within the Commission, has been
afforded no opportunity to pass.
Id.

70. Id.
71. Petition for Clarification or Reconsideration of a Citizen's Complaint Against
Pacifica Foundation, Station WvBAI(FM), Memorandum Opinion and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d
892, para. 3 (1976) [hereinafter Citizen's Complaint].
72. Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(No. 77-528) (citation omnitted); see also Violence Report, supra note 60.
73. Brief for Petitioner, supranote 72, at 11.
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cannot conceivably be construed as describing or even referring to sex
or excretion.7
Thus, the effect of the FCC Order was to prohibit the broadcasts of
the White House tapes, political speeches and rallies, and "many of the
great works of literature including Shakespearean plays and contemporary
plays which have won critical acclaim, the works of renowned classical and
7
contemporary poets and writers, and passages from the Bible." 1
Pacifica also argued that § 1464 was unconstitutionally vague unless
the term "indecent" was subsumed by the term "obscene" as defined in
Miller.76 The Carlin monologue was not obscene under the Miller test
because (1) it did not appeal to any prurient interest and (2) it had literary
and political value.7 Finally, Pacifica argued that the special qualities of
the broadcast medium did not justify suppressing nonobscene speech .7
In its brief, the FCC defended its special treatment of broadcasting
based on the four factors identified in the DeclaratoryOrder.7 9 It argued
that its order merely channeled patently offensive language to times when it
80
was least likely to "be thrust upon unsupervised young children."5
Accordingly, Pacifica's lengthy compilation of allegedly prohibited
quotations from the Bible, secular works of literature, and the "Nixon
tapes" represents a serious misinterpretation of the Commission's
order. These materials were not presented to the Commission, even
though Pacifica could have sought reconsideration. 8
Thus, the FCC suggested-but did not explicitly argue-that Pacifica was
precluded by § 405's exhaustion requirement from challenging the breadth
of the FCC's ruling because it had not made that argument before the FCC.
A week before the oral argument, the FCC issued an order on
reconsideration that narrowed the reach of the Declaratory Order. It
rejected RTNDA's claim that the DeclaratoryOrder would cause licensees

74. Id. at 7.
75. Id. at 23.
76. Id at 26-28.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 46. An amicus brief in support of Pacifica was filed by the San Francisco
Chapter of the Committee for Open Media. It argued that the Order would have an
especially harsh effect on the broadcast of plays attempting to realistically depict ghetto life.
Brief of Committee for Open Media, San Francisco Chapter as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 2, Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (No. 75-1391)
[hereinafter Open Media Br.]. As fuirther evidence that the Order was overbroad, it cited
studies showing that large numbers of children were in the broadcast audience even in the
late evening hours. Id. at 16-17.
79. Brief for Respondents at 16-23, Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (No. 75-13 19).
80. Id. at 24.
81. Id. at 28.
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to censor programming and inhibit broadcast journalism. 82 It emphasized
that the order was "issued in a specific context." 83 It clarified that a licensee
would not be held responsible for indecent language in covering live public
events where journalistic editing was not possible.8 However, it declined
to provide further guidance in the absence of a concrete factual situation.8 "
111. THE D.C. CIRCUIT
The case was argued before Judges Tamim, Bazelon, and Leventhal by
Joseph Marino for the FCC and Harry Plotkin for Pacifica. Marino did not
expect that Judge Bazelon would vote to affirm the FCC, but had hoped
Judge Tamm, a conservative jurist, would.8 However, the D.C. Circuit
voted two to one to reverse the FCC.8 Writing for the court, Judge Tamm
found that "[d]espite the Commission's professed intentions, the direct
effect of its Order is to inhibit the free and robust exchange of ideas on a
wide range of issues and subjects by means of radio and television
communications." 8 He rejected the FCC's claim that it was merely
channeling indecent language to certain times of the day: "In fact the Order
8
is censorship, regardless of what the Comnmission chooses to call it.", 1
Citing ratings that showed over one million children were watching
television until 1:00 a.m., he agreed with Pacifica that the "Commission's
action proscribes the uncensored broadcast of many of the great works of
literature including Shakespearian plays and contemporary plays which
have won critical acclaim, the works of renowned classical and
contemporary poets and writers, and passages from the Bible.""0
Because Judge Tamm found the FCC's action constituted censorship,
which was prohibited by section 326 of the Communications Act, he did
not address the FCC's argument that "indecent" differed from "obscene." 9 '
But, assuming arguendo that the FCC had the power to prohibit
nonobscene speech from being broadcast, he found the FCs order
overbroad because it "sweepingly forbids any broadcast of the seven words
irrespective of context or however innocent or educational they may be...
Clearly every use of these seven words cannot be deemed offensive even as

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Citizen's Complaint, supra note 71, at para. 4.

Id.
Id. at 893 n.
Id. at para. 5.
Marino Interview, supra note 40.
Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Id at 13.

Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
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to minors."9 Thus, he characterized the FCC's action as a "step toward
reducing the adult population to hearing or viewing only that which is fit

for children" and a "classic case of burning the house to roast the

pig.",93

Judge Bazelon concurred, but thought it was necessary to go beyond
Judge Tamm's decision and rule that, under the Miller test, the FCC's
definition of "indecent" speech was "massively overbroad" because it
failed to use local community standards, consider whether the work
appealed to prurient interest, and judge the work as a whole.9 He rejected
the FCC's argument that regulation was justified by the privacy interests of
unconsenting adults in their homes because any offense could be
minimized by changing the channel.9 He likewise dismissed the claim that
regulation was justified by the presence of children in the audience.9 While
conceding that "no one would dispute that there is a public interest in
stations airing programming suitable for children or that government has
greater power to regulate speech aimed at children than speech aimed at
adults,"9 adults with normal sleeping habits would be limited to programs
fit for children. If it were impractical to accommodate the competing
interests of children and adults, the court should err on the side of under
regulation because the harm to children could be minimized with warnings
and parental supervision, but harm from over regulation was
irremediable. 98
Judge Leventhal dissented. He stressed that the FCC had only held
that the specific broadcast was indecent, not that the broadcast of any one
of the seven words would be indecent. 99 He thought that the
"Commission's decision must be read narrowly, limited to the language 'as
broadcast' in the early afternoon."' 00 While he recognized that Carlin was
"a comedian of stature, and a social satirist," whose monologue might be
appreciated by a "mature audience,"
92. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). Judge Tamm also concluded that the FCC's action was
vague because it failed to define "children," noting that a nineteen-year-old had different
needs than a seven-year-old. Id.
93. Id. at 17 (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)). He also found no
empirical support for the FCC's claim that, had it not taken action, "filth [would] flood the
airwaves," and suggested that market forces would limit the broadcast of offensive
language. Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 18.
94. Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 21 (Bazelon, J., concurring).
95. Id.at 26.

96. Id. at 28.
97. Id. at 27.
98. Id at 27-28. Judge Bazelon also found the FCC's decision based on undocumented
assumptions that most parents would consider such language unsuitable for children and that
parents were less able to control their children's listening habits than their access to other
media. Id at 28.
99. Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 31 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 3 2.
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every society has special vocabularies appropriate only for special
groups, times and places. What the licensee did here was to broadcast

them broadside, in houses and elsewhere; and to present the persistent,
almost lavishly loving reiteration of the special words
in an afternoon
10
broadcast when children were likely in the audience. 1
In Leventhal's view, the FCC's action reflected "a broad consensus of
society, the view that the great bulk of families would consider it
potentially dangerous to their children. ...~ While families should have
the means to choose programming appropriate for children, the
pervasiveness of broadcasting radio made that impossible. Since a majority
of families with school-aged children had working mothers, children would
be listening unsupervised.10 3 Although children might hear these words
elsewhere, hearing them broadcast created the impression that their use was
generally acceptable.'04
Judge Leventhal saw the FCC's action as an appropriate time, place,
or manner regulation rather than censorship.105 While acknowledging that
vagueness was "to some extent inherent" in the concept of indecency, he
thought that the judicial review would ensure protection for works of
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.106 In sum, the FCC had made
an appropriate constitutional trade-off between assisting parents in
protecting young children and protecting privacy versus free speech
interests. 107
The FCC, with the support of the DOJ, promptly sought rehearing en
banc.'0 8 Its petition emphasized the importance of deciding the statutory
question-that is, "whether the word 'indecent' as used in § 1464 has a
separate meaning from the term 'obscene.""109 The FCC agreed with Judge
Leventhal that its "order was a declaration on a specific set of facts. When
the Commission is confronted with a different set of facts, it can then
determine whether the principles announced in this order should be applied,
modified, or extended."" 0o The D.C. Circuit denied rehearing in an
unpublished order on May 10, 1977.11
101. Idat33.
102. Id.
103. Idat34.
104. Id
105. Id. at 34 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 35.
107. Id. at 37.
108. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Pacifica Found. v.
FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (No. 75-1 391).
109. Id. at 1-2.
110. Id. at 8.
111. Although the suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied per curium, the Order
notes that four of the nine Judges-Leventhal, McKinnon, Robb, and Wilkey-would have

212

21

COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
~FEDERAL

[o.663
[Vol.

IV. THE SuPREmE COURT DECISION IN PACIFICA
The FCC filed its petition for certiorari on October 7, 1977.1 12
Normally, the Solicitor General's office would represent the FCC in
seeking review in the Supreme Court.' 13 Here, although the DOJ joined the
FCC in defending its Order in the D.C. Circuit, it did not join in the
petition for certiorari." 4 This change of position may have been due to the
change in administration. Democrat Jimmy Carter became President in
January 1977, and in March, he appointed Wade H. McCree to replace
Robert H. Bork as Solicitor General." 5 However, the Republican Chairman
of the FCC, Richard Wiley, served until October 13, just a few days after
16
the FCC's certiorari petition was filed.'

A.

Decision to Grant Certiorari

The Court took up whether to grant certiorari at its conference on
January 6, 1978.1"1 The pool memo prepared for this conference by Justice
Powell's clerk, Jim Alt, summarized the facts, decisions below, and
contentions of the parties." 8 The FCC had argued that certiorari should be
granted to decide whether the unique quality of the broadcast media

granted the suggestion. A copy of the Order is attached to the FCC's Brief. Brief of
Petitioner FCC app. at 1, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-528).
112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-528).
113. The United States, represented by the DOJ, is automatically a party in appeals of the
FCC taken under § 402(a) of the Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2006); 28
U.S.C. § 2344 (2006). However, even though the Attorney General is responsible for the
interests of the Government in all court proceedings under that chapter, an agency whose
interests would be affected if its order were set aside may appear as a party and be
represented by its own counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (2006).
114. Brief for the United States, Pacifica,438 U.S. 726 (No. 77-52 8).
115. Marino recalled that Bork decided not to support seeking certiorari. Although
Marino did not attend the meeting with Bork, he suspects that the petition was circulated for
comment, and that the Criminal Division, which was responsible for enforcing § 1464, had a
different view than the Antitrust Division, which had been involved in the case in the D.C.
Circuit. This theory is consistent with the explanation given at oral argument. See Marino
Interview, supra note 40.
116. Because the FCC is an independent agency, Commissioners may continue to serve
out their terms after a new administration takes over. In this case, Wiley agreed to remain as
Chairman until a new Chairman could be appointed and confirmed. Wiley Interview, supra
note 55. Democrat Charles Ferris became FCC Chairman on October 17, 1977.
117. Preliminary Memorandum for Jan. 6, 1978 Conference, No. 77-528 (Dec. 13, 1977)
[hereinafter Pool Memo]. Copies of this Pool Memo were found in the papers of both
Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell.
118. Pool Memo, supra note 117. The practice of pooling clerks, dividing up the filings,
and having a single memo circulated among all the participants began in 1972 as a way to
reduce the workload as a result of the increasing number of cert petitions being filed. Some
Justices, including Justice Stevens, did not participate in the pool. DAVI M. O'BRIEN,
STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT INAMERICAN POLITICS 140 (8th ed. 2008).
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justified its action. 119 In opposing certiorari, Pacifica argued that the D.C.
Circuit correctly found the Commission's Order overbroad and that the
DOJ's decision not to support certiorari demonstrated that the case posed
20
no important issue of federal law.'1
The pooi memo recommended against hearing the case, noting that
"[bjecause of the legislative nature of the Commission's order and the
divergence of views on D.C. Cir., this case comes here in rather an
unfocused state."'12 ' Moreover,
it seems likely that the Commission's approach, with its focus on
words, rather than on words and context, was not sufficiently
discerning even taking into account the special problems of the
broadcast media. The Commission made it quite clear that a
broadcast's claim to serious merit would make no difference in
determining whether it was "indecent" except, perhaps, if the broadcast
were late at night. As Judge Tamm pointed out, this would keep a fair
number of serious works off the air at times when most adults could
listen. Even granting validity to the Commission's "channeling"
approach, one would think that it might have taken into account both
the adults' interest in access to such22works, and the possibility that
children could be shielded from them.'1
The memo concluded that "[gliven the breadth of the declaratory portion of
the Commission's order, and its potential chilling effect on broadcasters,
the majority's overbreadth approach seems more appropriate than the
dissenter's as-applied approach. Thus, unless the Court is inclined to
review the majority's overbreadth holding, the case probably is not worth

taking."123

The Justices vote at conference whether to hear a case. Generally,
four votes are needed for a case to be accepted.12 4 Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White, Rehnquist, and Stevens voted in favor of certiorari. 2
Justices Powell and Blackmun voted 'join 3," meaning that they would

119.
120.
12 1.
122.
123.

Pool Memo, supranote 117, at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10. On Justice Powell's copy of the pool memo, Alt wrote on the first page: "I

would deny this petition." On the last page he explained: "Because I think the FCC's

declaratory order was overbroad and showed a startling insensitivity to the interests of
everyone except children, I would deny." Id. Justice Blackmun's clerk, Ruth Glushien,
agreed with the recommendation, adding: "The FCC clearly intended its order to guide
broadcasters generally; hence the overbreadth concern is apt. I think the majority's view that
the order was overbroad under 47 USC § 326 is well-supported. Hence, I see no reason to
take the case." Id. at 10 (on file in Blackmun Papers).
124. O'BiuEN, supranote 118, at 211.
125. Tally Sheet (Jan. 6, 1978), FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77528) (Powell files) (showing vote at conference).
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vote in favor of hearing the case if three others did.'126 Justices Brennan,
Stewart, and Marshall voted to deny certiorari.'12
Justice Powell's notes on the tally sheet indicate that the Chief Justice
voted to hear the case because he wanted to reverse the D.C. Circuit.
Powell's join-3 vote seems to have been prompted by his agreement with
Judge Leventhal and disagreement with Judge Bazelon. At the top of the
pooi memo Powell wrote: "the [FCC's] definition [of indecent language] is
certainly broad, but J. Leventhal (not a judge unsympathetic to 1 st amend')
read it narrowly & would sustain the FCC order. TV & Radio should not
have the latitude of the Miller standard & FCC was addressing an urgent
need."' And, next to the statement that Bazelon had questioned the FCC's
premise that parents did not want children to hear indecent language and
were unable to control children's listening, he wrote: "Bazelon must not
have children." 2 9

The Briefs

B.

The FCC's brief presented two issues.13 0 The first was whether the
term "indecent" as used in § 1464 was subsumed within the term "obscene"
or had a special meaning as applied to broadcasting.'13 '1 The FCC argued
that the term should be given special meaning because (1) children have
easy access to radio and are often unsupervised; (2) "radio receivers are in
the home, where individual rights to privacy are entitled to particular
respect;" (3) nonconsenting adults may tune in without warning; and (4) the
scarcity of frequencies required licensing in the public interest."
The second issue was whether the FCC reasonably concluded that
certain words in the Carlin monologue were "indecent" as broadcast.133 The
FCC argued it was reasonable to conclude that Pacifica "abused its special
trust by broadcasting for nearly twelve minutes a record which repeated
over and over words which depict sexual and excretory organs and
activities in a manner patently offensive by its community's contemporary
34
standards in the early afternoon when children were in the audience."'
126.

O'BRiEN, supra note

118, at 215.

127. Certiorari was granted on January 9, 1978. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 434 U.S. 1008
(1978).
128. Pool Memo, supra note 117, at 1.
129. Id. at 7.
130. Brief for the FCC at 2, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-528).
131. 1d.
132. Id. at 24-25.
133. Idat2.
134. Id. at 27. Amicus briefs in support of the FCC were filed by Morality in Media,
Brief of Morality in Media, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner FCC, Pacfica,438
U.S. 726 (No. 77-528), and the U.S. Catholic Conference, Brief of United States Catholic
Conference as Ainicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner FCC, Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (No. 77-
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Respondent Pacifica argued that the FCC's ruling set a "standard of
'decency' applicable to all broadcasters" that prohibited the "unexpurgated
broadcast of great works of classical and contemporary literature, including
even passages from the Bible."'135 Pacifica also argued that the FCC's
construction of the term "indecent" was precluded by Hamling v. United
States, which had construed "indecency" as used in § 1461 of the Criminal
Code, which contained language similar to § 1464, as "subsumed" by the
36
definition of "obscene" set forth in Miller.'
Pacifica further argued that the FCC's order could not be justified
based on the unique qualities of broadcasting. First, Pacifica argued that the
scarcity rationale "cannot justify the Commission's action which serves to
lessen the number of available voices, and thus aggravates, rather than
alleviates, the problem of scarcity.",13 1 Second, the FCC's attempt to protect
unsupervised children was a "classic example of unconstitutional
overbreadth., 138 Third, the FCC's action unconstitutionally intruded into
the role of parents.139 Fourth, radio and television broadcasts did not invade
the privacy of the home, but were invited; thus, undesired content could be
40

avoided.1

The United States, represented by the Solicitor General, also filed a
brief as a Respondent. It argued that it was "impossible to read the
Commission's order in any way except as an absolute ban, for most
528).
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Brief for Pacifica Found. at 11, Pacfica,438 U.S. 726 (No. 77-528).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 53-55.
140. Id. at 56-59. Several amicus briefs were filed in support of Pacifica. For example,
the ABC, CBS, and NBC networks, filing jointly with the NAB, RTNDA, and others,
argued that
Although the Commission has only proscribed here the broadcast of a comic
monologue discussing society's use of and attitude toward 'dirty words,' the
authority it has asserted would clearly extend much fuirther. if successful here, the
Commission would be placed in the position of a censor, free to forbid whatever is
objectionable to "the most vocal and powerful of orthodoxies."
Brief for American Broadcasting Company, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 13, Paciica, 438 U.S. 726 (No. 77-528) thereinafter ABC Br.] (citations
omitted). The ACLU and others argued that the FCC's Order was intended to establish
broad, nationwide standards for the broadcast of "indecent" language, that minors had a
First Amendment right to listen to the radio free of FCC censorship, and that the FCC
lacked legal authority to issue a declaratory ruling. Brief of the American Civil Liberties
Union et al. as Amici Curiae at 6-11, Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (No. 77-528). The Writers
Guild argued that "to forbid the use of words is to forbid the expression of ideas and
feelings," and that it violated the First Amendment to equate principles of free speech "with
those which govern property nuisances." Brief of Writers Guild, West, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, 5, Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (No. 77-528) (original
formatting omitted).

21

216

~FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS LA WJO URNAL

[o.663
[Vol.

broadcasting hours, on the utterance of any of the specified words,
regardless of context."141 Because section 326 of the Communications Act
prohibited the FCC from censoring broadcasts protected by the First
Amendment, the FCC could not invoke the Act's public interest authority
to "wholly ban from the airways, at least for most hours, one species of
,,142
language on grounds that have nothing to do with 'balance' or diversity.
At the same time, the United States disagreed with Pacifica that the
term "indecency" was subsumed by the term "obscene." It argued that the
"use of the disjunctive indicates that the prohibition encompasses language
which is either obscene or indecent or profane., 14 1 While acknowledging
that the "category of 'indecent' words and phrases is not self-defining,"
most of the words used by Carlin would fall into that category.'"4 It
concluded that if "the First Amendment does not prevent it, we believe the
45
Commission still remains free to apply the statute as a nuisance law."'9
However, the United States concluded that the FCC's action did violate the
First Amendment. It could not be justified as a "time, place, and manner
restriction" because offensive broadcasts could easily be avoided by
turning the radio off and the "rights of adults cannot be abridged for the
sake of the children."146 The United States suggested that a carefully
drafted partial ban on indecent broadcasts could be consistent with the First
Amendment.147 However, the FCC's suggestion that indecent language
might be permitted after 10:00 p.m. was "too grudging, and too arbitrary, to
salvage the rule." 4

Preparationfor Oral Argument

C

To prepare the Justices for an oral argument, the clerks typically draft
"bench memos," summarizing the facts, issues, and arguments;
recommending questions for oral argument; and suggesting how their
141.
142.
143.
144.

Brief for the United States at 14, Pacifica,438 U.S. 726 (No. 77-528).
Id at 19.

Id
Idat2O0.

145. Idat23.
146. Id. at 35. The United States also suggested that children hearing "indecent"
language on the radio was hardly a "matter of the gravest concern" because they heard the
same words elsewhere. Id at 35-36.
147. Brief for the United States at 36-37, 38 Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (No. 77-528).
148. Id at 38. In the final section, titled "A Caveat," the United States stressed that
neither the FCC nor the DOJ was entirely powerless to deal with extreme cases, suggesting
that sanctions could constitutionally be imposed where indecent words were "spewed forth
without any arguable justification in a conscious attempt to shock, offend or outrage" or in
broadcasts specifically directed to young children. Id. at 39-41. The FCC's short reply brief
highlighted the areas of agreement between the DOJ and the FCC and stressed that its ruling
"was limited to the facts complained about" and had "not imposed a flat ban on these or any
other words." Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4, 7, Pacfica, 438 U.S. 726 (No. 77-528).
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Justice might vote.'14 9 Both the Powell and Blackmun clerks recommended
that their Justices affirm the D.C. Circuit's decision. 150
1.

Justice Powell's Chambers

James Alt's bench memo for Justice Powell identified three issues for
decision. On the first issue, whether the validity of the Order should be
considered on its face or as applied, Alt disagreed with Judge Leventhal,
despite his respect for him.' 1 Alt thought that the FCC's express intent in
issuing a declaratory ruling was to lay down general rules to govern future
conduct, and that Judge Leventhal gave insufficient weight to concerns that
the rules would deter constitutionally protected speech. 5 12 Alt wrote:
"Although I realize that you are no great fan of overbreadth analysis, I
would urge that, at least in the first instance, you consider whether the rules
53
are 'substantially overbroad,' and hence subject to facial invalidation."' 1
As to the second issue, whether the term "indecent" could be
construed to mean something other than "obscene," Alt concluded that
"Congress probably meant to reach all language that constitutionally could
be proscribed, whether or not it is 'obscene."", 54 Justice Powell agreed,
noting in the margin: "Since 1464 include[s] 'indecent', we must reach
const. issue.~~5
Regarding the third issue, Alt found two features of the FCs order
especially troublesome.116 First,
the fact that unwilling adults are free to tune out offensive
programmaing - to avert their ears, in effect - seems to me to cut
strongly against the notion that the FCC must be able to protect adults
whose sensitivities might be offended.
The second feature . . . is that the FCC Order makes almost no attempt
to accomodate [sic] the asserted interest in protecting children with
adults' interest in hearing programming that is permissible for willing

149. See O'BRiEN, supra note 118, at 14 1.
150. Bench Memorandum from Ruth Glushien, Clerk to Justice Blackmun, to Justice
Blackmun (Apr. 17, 1978) (on file in Blackmun Papers) [hereinafter Glushien Bench
Memo]; Bench Memorandum from James Alt, Clerk to Justice Powell, to Justice Powell
(Apr. 17, 1978) (on file in Powell Papers) [hereinafter Alt Bench Memo].
151. Alt Bench Memo, supra note 150, at 4.
152. Id. at 4-5.
153. Id. at 5.
154. Id. at 6.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 14. Alt thought Pacifica's strongest argument was that under Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the FCC could not ban nonobscene speech because it
offended some people. In Cohen, the Court noted that people who were offended by a man's
jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" "could effectively avoid further bombardment of
their sensitivities by simply averting their eyes." Id at 2 1.

218

21
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL

[Vol.
[o.663

adults."' 7
Alt believed that "context must count for something, both to protect
the children's own First Amendment rights, and to provide a measure of
protection to adults' rights."' 58 Because the FCC completely failed to take
context into account, he "would hold the FCC order overbroad on its
face." 59
Alt attempted to sketch out a "constitutionally permissible scheme of
regulation"160 and, noting that Powell took the position in his dissent in
Rosenfeld v. New Jersey that some language, which was neither obscene
nor fighting words, may be so offensive that government could protect
unwilling listeners,16 '1 Alt suggested that the FCC could constitutionally
prohibit "deliberately assaultive language" that lacked any value.' Works
of value with offensive language, such as the Carlin monologue or the
Nixon tapes, could be channeled into time slots where the fewest number of
unsupervised children would be listening. He also suggested that the FCC
could not constitutionally prohibit the broadcasts that "contain only
occasional offensive language," such as "filmed news reports of public
demonstrations."16 3 Thus, he recommended that the case be sent back to the
FCC for a "second attempt."'64
Justice Powell was not impressed by Alt's arguments. In handwritten
notations in the margins, he indicated that although he believed that verbal
assaults on an unwilling audience could be constitutionally prohibited, he
did not view this case ''as involving adults'' or preventing them from
having access to programming. 66' Next to Alt's observation that it is "not
easy" to sketch out a constitutionally permissible regulation, he wrote
66
"impossible."
In pre-argument notes, Powell wrote that "[m]uch depends on how

one reads FCC order" and that Judge Leventhal read it narrowly. 6 7 He
157. Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. Id. at 15 (citations omitted).
159. Id.
160. Id
161. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 905-06 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). In
this case, the defendant was prosecuted under a New Jersey statute for using the word
,'motherfucker" four times during an address to a public school board meeting. See

generally id
162. Alt Bench Memo, .supranote 150, at 15.
163. Id at 16.
164. Id
165. Id. at 2, 13-14.
166. Id. at 15.
167. Miscellaneous Preargument Notes by Justice Powell, 77-528 FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation (Apr. 18, 1978), in THE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. PAPERS, 1921-1998, at 2 (Lewis
F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington and Lee U., Lexington, Va.).
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observed that "Leventhal's view - strongly endorsed by FCC's briefs - is
that it is the 'holding' that must be viewed as being all that is before us,"
and that the rest of the FCC's order was only "informational."'968 Thus,
before oral argument, Justice Powell seemed to lean strongly in favor of
reversing the D.C. Circuit, even though his clerk had recommended
otherwise.
Justice Blackmun's Chambers
Blackmun clerk Ruth Glushien also recommended affirming the D.C.
Circuit and finding the FCC Order overbroad under either the First
Amendment or section 326 of the Communications Act.'16 9 As to how
broadly to read the FCC Order, she observed that Judge Leventhal had read
it "merely as proscribing Mr. Carlin's particular language 'as
broadcast."",70 However, she had the impression that the FCC was "trying
to reduce the size of its target after the fact," because
this was the first occasion since Miller v. California's reformulation of
the definition of obscenity, that the Commission had had a chance to
treat the problem of "indecent" language and that the opinion would
"clarify the standards which will be utilized in considering the public's
complaints" about the broadcast of indecent language. [Paragraphs] I11
and 12 of the opinion deliberately sketch out the applicable principles
and only then, in [Paragraph] 1114, does the Commission go on to apply
them to the Carlin broadcast.''
Moreover, the FCC issued a DeclaratoryOrder instead of an NAL because
it was "admirably suited . . . to clarify[ing] the standards which the
Commission utilizes to judge indecent language."'712 Thus, Glushien
"would take the Commission's order as a broad ranging one."'
Next, she considered whether the FCC had authority to regulate
nonobscene speech.'174 Glushien agreed with the Solicitor General that "the
2.

168. Id.

169. Glushien Bench Memo, supra note 150.
170. Id. at 4.
171. Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 6. (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Id. at 7.
174. Pacifica had argued that the FCC lacked authority because when § 1464 "states that
'any obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio communication' is
punishable, 'indecent' is mere surplusage, subsumed in the category of 'obscene' language.",
Id at 8. Pacifica relied on two cases, United States v. Twelve 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm
Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973), and llamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), which had
construed similar language in § § 1462 and 1461, respectively, of Title 18, as limited to
material meeting the Miller standard for obscenity. The FCC responded that that "although
Hamling and Twelve 200-Foot Reels might support Pacifica's argument, the unique nature
of the airwaves suffices to impute to Congress the intention to regulate non-obscene speech,
because of the medium's scarcity and intrusiveness, particularly as to children." Glushien
Bench Memo, supra note 150, at 10.
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use of the disjunctive [in § 1464] indicates an intention to have three
separate categories" of prohibited broadcasts-obscene, indecent, and
75

profane.1

Third, Glushien considered whether the rule was overbroad. She
disagreed with the FC's argument that overbreadth scrutiny was improper
in an adjudicatory proceeding because "the agency functionally intended to
use the adjudicatory proceeding as the occasion for announcing a new
standard; [ and i]f allowed to stand unchallenged, the de facto rule would
chill the exercise of First Amendment rights by other broadcasters. 7 She
noted that Judge Leventhal's argument that Pacifica had failed to object to
the breadth of the rule by seeking reconsideration presented the "most
serious challenge to overbreadth analysis." 7
On the substance, Glushien thought that the Solicitor General had
provided the "best analysis."'7 18 Its brief argued that the Court had never
79
applied a "special standard for mixed audiences of children and adults."1
Moreover, it distilled a three-part test from the "nuisance regulation cases:
(a) How offensive, to how many people, is the disputed speech; (b) how
captive is the audience of unwilling listeners; (c) how great a deterrant [sic]
effect on speech will the ban have?' 80 Although Glushien thought that the
FCC's action could be found reasonable under this test, the United States
reached the opposite conclusion.''
Finally, Glushien addressed the "close question" of whether the rule
was constitutional as applied.182 The FCC had presented no empirical data
to support children's viewing patterns, while amici American Broadcasting
Company et al. offered data suggesting that few children listened to the

radio at 2:00

p.m. 183

Moreover, the FCC had received only one complaint,

84
and the radio station had warned that vulgar language would be used.1
Additionally, "the premise that such language was completely unexpected.
is widely known
..is also a little hard to swallow ... [because] WBAI. ...
for 'hip' Greenwich Village-type broadcasting, with several hours a week

175. Glushien Bench Memo, supra note 150, at 11. Because the FCC had authority under

§ 1464, she saw no reason to reach the question of whether section 303(g) of the
Communications Act, which allows the FCC to regulate to promote the effective use of
radio, granted the FCC authority to regulate indecent speech. Glushien Bench Memo, supra
note 150, at 12.
176. Glushien Bench Memo, supra note 150, at 13.
177. Id. at 14.
178. Id.
179. Id
180. Id. at 15.
181. Id at 16-17.
182. Id at 18.
183. Id.
184. Id
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of programming on gay rights, Puerto Rican nationalists, and what-haveyou.""' 5 On the other hand, the Carlin monologue "focuse[d] on indecent
words in a concerted and protracted way, and in the hands of a jury I would
not be surprised if the dialogue was held to constitute 'a conscious attempt
to shock, offend or outrage."", 86 Glushien recommended affirming the D.C.
Circuit "either on the ground of over-breadth or by holding Section 1464 to
87
have been applied beyond its constitutional limit."'1

Justice Blackmun's notes suggest, however, that he was more inclined
to agree with Judge Leventhal. Next to the summary of the D.C. Circuit
judges' opinion, he wrote "Leventhal did his best to save."'188 In the margin,
next to the question of whether the case presented only the narrow question
of whether the words were indecent as broadcast, he wrote "Quaere
whether overbreadth properly raised below" and "this is difficl.' 9 At the
bottom of the page, he wrote "Stay with Leventhal." 90
D.

The OralArgument

The oral argument took place on April 18-19, 1978. Joseph A.
Marino argued for the FCC.19' He began by pointing out that the FCC and
DOJ agreed that in enacting § 1464, Congress intended to prohibit the
broadcast of both obscene and indecent speech and that they were not the
same thing.192 He described the words in the Carlin monologue as "verbal
taboos" or "verbal slaps."'19 3 He argued that Judge Leventhal's dissent had
properly construed the FCC's Order.94 Although Pacifica and the DOJ
presented the FCs Order as a "flat ban," it was only a DeclaratoryOrder

185. Id. at 18-19.
186. Id. at 18.
187. Id. atl19.
188. Miscellaenous Preargument Notes of Justice Blackmun, 77-528 FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation (on file in Blacumun Papers).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. By this time, Marino was no longer the head of Litigation and was working in the
Conmmon Carrier Bureau. He asked to keep the Pacifica case when he went to the Bureau,
so he was able to work on the briefs and argue in the D.C. Circuit. By the time briefs needed
to be filed in the Supreme Court, Ferris had become Chairman. Marino was surprised when
then General Counsel Robert Bruce asked him to write the brief. Marina agreed to do the
brief if he could argue the case. He had never argued in the Supreme Court before. Marina
Interview, supra note 40.
192. Transcript of Oral Argument at 2, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)

(No. 77-528), reprintedin 101

LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1977 TERM SUPPLEMENT 678 (Philip B.

Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., University Publications of America 1979) [hereinafter
Kurland & Casper].
193. Id.
194. Id. at 677.
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limited to the facts presented, and at heart, an attempt to protect children by
channeling such programming to times when children were unlikely to be
in the audience.19 5
Marino finished his argument in about nine minutes with no
interruptions and was about to sit down when the Justices started asking
questions. 196 Justice Stevens wanted to know whether saying the same
words on GB radio would be a crime, since the statute seemed to apply to
all forms of radio communication.197 Marino was flustered by the question,
98
and after a long pause, said that the FCC had no position on that issue.,
Justice Stevens tried again, asking whether the same words in the same
statute could mean different things in different proceedings.' 9 9 Marino
explained that the DOJ was responsible for criminal enforcement, while the
FCC could take only administrative action .200 The Chief Justice asked
whether the FCC might consider that a CB operator used such words when
the GB license came up for renewal, and Marino agreed that the FCC
would consider it under the public interest standard of the Communications
Act. 20 1
Another Justice tried again to pin Marino down as to whether the
word "indecent" could mean one thing for purposes of the FCC's
administrative enforcement, and something else for purposes of the DOJ's
criminal enforcement. 0 The Chief Justice tried to help him out: "The same
conduct, the same words, whether they were ultimately found to be
criminal or non-criminal, might constitute the basis for not renewing a
license, might they not?" 20 3 Marino agreed that the FCC could, and did,
address indecent language under the public interest standard, but "felt that
since that specific prohibition has been in the statute [18 U.S.C. § 1464], it
would try to give some concrete meaning to it, and limit it as much as
possible in the light of this Court's opinions in First Amendment cases." 2
Harry M. Plotkin, of Arent Fox Kintner Plotkin & Kahn, argued for
195. Id. at 679.
196. This can be heard when listening to the oral argument. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
Oral
Argument,
OYEZ.ORG,
http://www.oyez.org/cases/19701979/1977/1977_77_528/argument (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
197. Kurland & Casper, supra note 192, at 680; see also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
Oral Argument, supra note 196, for clarification of which Justice was speaking throughout.
198. See Kurland & Casper, supra note 192, at 680-81; see also FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation Oral Argument, supra note 196, for descriptions of tone and nature the oral
argument.
199. Idat681.
200. Id. at 681-82.
201. Id. at 682-83.
202. Id.
203. Kurland & Casper, supra note 192, at 684.
204. Id.
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Pacifica. He stressed that WVBAI was a "noncommercial educational station
in New York, with a limited audience. 0 It aired the Carlin recording
preceded by a warning in the context of a serious discussion program. One
Justice asked whether the warning would lead young people to turn off the
program or whether it was intended as a "come-on. 2 06 Plotkin replied that
it was not intended as a come-on because "this is not the type of station
that's devoted to commercial enterprises, this was not a [pandering]
program, it's not a titillating program, it's a station which does devote itself
to the unusual programs, to highly controversial programs, to a wide
variety of programming." 0 7
Justice Marshall seemed skeptical:
THE COURT: But of course the child that happens to tune in knows
what kind of station it is?
MR. PLOTKIN: Oh, yes; yes. The child was sitting with his father, and
presumablyTHE COURT: No, I say the average child knows that this is an
educational station which has a broad range of programs-how in the
world could a child know that?
MR. PLOTKIN: How could he know it's educational?
THE COURT: Yes.
Well, this particular child, we know very little about
MR. PLOTKIN:
8
him.20
Plotkin moved on to argue that the FCC had acted inconsistently by
taking action against Pacifica for indecent language, while at the same time
concluding that the First Amendment precluded it from taking action
against violent programs. Although conceding that § 1464 prohibited
indecent but not violent programming, Plotkin argued that the statute did
not give the FCC authority to issue a general declaration that certain words
were banned "even though they have literary, artistic or scientific value." 09
This claim prompted Justice Marshall to interject:
THE COURT: Are you arguing now that this has literary or artistic
value?
MR. PLOTKIN: Well, as a matter of fact, in the over-all context, yes,
there was; yes. The words themselves may not, but in the over-all
context, yes, Your Honor....
THE COURT: This is educational, in your view?
205. Id at 685. The Chief Justice asked for clarification and Plotkin replied: "It's a
noncommercial educational station. That means it's a station licensed [to] a nonprofit
organization. ...there can be no commercials on it, and its programs are of an educational
nature. It's like WVETA here in Washington; the same type of station." To which Justice
Rehnquist quipped, "Almost!" and the audience laughed. Id. at 686.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Kurland & Casper, supra note 192, at 687.
209. Id at 688.
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MR. PLOTKIN': The question as to whether it's educational or not was
not involved in this case. As to whether it has artistic literary or
scientific value, yes. Even Commissioner Robinson, who concurred in
the case, on a very narrow point, said that if he had to judge upon
whether it had artistic, literary or scientific value, said he would come
down and decide that it did have it. But, he agreed with the
Commission that you don't look at context when children are likely to
be in the audience.
THE COURT: Well, I'm not an expert, but if that's artistic, deliver
m.210

After the laughter died down, Plotkin moved on to his statutory
argument. He pointed out that in Federal Communications Commission v.
ABC, the Court overturned an FCC regulation interpreting a criminal
statute differently than the DOJ.2 11 He drew a parallel to this case, claiming
that § 1464 used "exactly the same type of words" as § 1461,21 which had
been before the Court in Hamling.213 He said, "this Court has specifically
held that, as a matter of statutory construction, that when those words are
used, the words 'indecent, filthy, vile and obscene' must mean the same as
'obscene"'. to avoid vagueness. 2 14 At this point, Justice Rehnquist
interjected, "To say 'hell' may be a little bit of an overstatement, may it
not?" 2 15 Noting that Justice Rehnquist wrote the Hamling opinion, Plotkin
conceded it was not a holding:
technically that was 1461 there and this is 1464. But the words in the
statute are the same. The meaning was the same. We have a First
Amendment medium here just as we do there, and it seems to me that
not only do we have a First Amendment medium under the First
Amendment, but Section 326 of the Communications Act specifically
says that the Commission shall have no power of censorship.
Now, this is an entirely different thing from the fairness doctrine, or
lack of balance, where, because this is a medium where scarcity is a
factor, the Court has said that in order to make sure that the medium
was made available to a maximum number of people, we will impose
210. Id.
211. In FCC v. ABC, 347 U.S. 284 (1954), the Supreme Court upheld a decision
enjoining enforcement of the FCC's rules implementing § 1304 of the Criminal Code,
formerly section 316 of the Communications Act. This statute prohibited the broadcast of
lotteries and certain "give-aways" and was jointly enforced by the FCC and DOJ. Id. at 284.
The FCC's rules implementing the statute were more restrictive than the statute. The Court
agreed that the FCC's interpretation had "stretch[ed] the statute to the breaking point." Id. at
294. While acknowledging the FCC's rules did not apply to criminal cases, the Court found
that the statute could not be construed one way by the FCC and another by the DOJ. Id. at
296.
212. Kurland & Casper, supra note 192, at 689.
213. In Hainling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), a closely divided Court upheld a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1461, which prohibits the mailing of "[e]very obscene, lewd,
lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article." Id at 98 n.8.
214. Kurland & Casper, supra note 192, at 689.
215. Id.
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certain duties upon broadcast stations to make sure that all can use it.
But that's an entirely different thing from the Government coming in
and saying that you are forbidden to do something; and in the Red Lion
case, which Mr. Justice White authored, you made that very point, that
where there's a fairness doctrine and the personal attack doctrine might
be sustained, because it's expanding the medium . . . an entirely
different question would be presented if the Government here were
trying to suppress speech; and that's exactly what they are doing here,
they are trying to suppress speech. And if they are trying to suppress
speech, they must be asked to pass the same test here as they do in any
other First Amendment meaning. The fact that this is radio does not
make a difference.
THE COURT: Well now, you say the question was reserved in Red
Lion, as it certainly was, that doesn't necessarily mean that in the case
of regulated airwaves they have to pass the same tests as they would if
they sought to impose this test on a newspaper, does it?
MR. PLOTKIN: I think 326 does mean that, Your Honor.... I think
Congress was saying that in Section 326, when it says "the
Commission shall have no power of censorship." When it comes to
suppression, I think the same test is applicable to radio and television
as is applicable to a newspaper.
THE COURT: Well, then you say literally the FCC can never tell any
station that it may not put out any particular message?
MR. PLOTKIN: I say that they .. , cannot suppress what a radio or
television station can do any more than they can any other.21
Justice Rehnquist pressed Plotkin further:
Well, supposing under your definition of censorship that a station just
decided that for an hour it would put on a record consisting of one
four-letter word repeated over and over again for the hour, no one
would make any claim that it had any coherent message . .. . Under
your definition, would the FCC be powerless because of the censorship
statute to effect that?
MR. PLOTKIN: I think it would be powerless to tell them to stop
doing it. I would have the same problem in response to your
hypothetical question if the station did nothing, say, but play "The
Music Goes Round and Round" all day. It is not because of the
content, but because a station is required to operate in the public
interest....
But not because the particular words are bad, not because particular
words have a particular taboo. Here the Commission was saying that
just because you use these seven words, no matter in what context, if
you put on a show where people call in and discuss a live subject, a
controversial issue, and if some of the people came from the kind of
culture that uses these kinds of words as part of their discussion,
particularly in anger and heat, the Commission would say that if you
did that in the afternoon that this would be a violation of the Criminal
Code so far as the Commission can see it, and it would also be ground
216. Id at 690-9 1.
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fuorievoking their license. I don't think the Commission has that
When the argument resumed the next day, Louis F. Claiborne from
the Solicitor General's office immediately faced a barrage of questions
about whom he represented and why the United States' position differed
from the FCC's. He explained that he represented the Executive Branch of
the government, and that the FCC, along with several other agencies, had
been authorized by statute to represent itself in certain situations .21 1 In
addition, the DOJ had a separate interest because it had an independent
responsibility to enforce § 1464 as a criminal matter.
Justice Rehnquist asked:
if this Court upholds the FCC, the Government will have no problem
prosecuting cases under the statute, because it will be given a fairly
broad construction, I would take it.
MR. CLAIBORNE: Mr. Justice Rehnquist, the Government, that is,
the Solicitor General and the Department of Justice, takes the view that
they should not press for broader prosecutorial discretion than in their
view the constitutional reach of the statute would authorize. And,
accordingly, it seems to us that the Court ought to have the benefit of
the views of the Department of Justice as to the constitutional reach of
the statute.
THE COURT: Would you think the Government is ever entitled as an
institutional litigator through the Solicitor General to assert that an act
of Congress is unconstitutional?
MR. CLAIBORNE: Mr. Justice Rehnquist, there may be rare
occasions when that is so. This is not such an occasion. We do not
suggest that the statute is unconstitutional, we suggest that it has a
limited application and that the Commission has construed it beyond
that constitutional reach.21
Justice Powell pointed out that the DOJ had supported the FCC
below. Claiborne admitted that it did, and that it was an
"embarrassment. 220 He explained that the Antitrust Division had handled
the matter in the lower court, while the Criminal Division handled the
decision whether to file a petition for certiorari .221 He added that, although
the DOJ thought that the lower court decision was correct, and that it had a
duty to give the Court the benefit of its views, it did not oppose the FCC
filing the petition for certiorari on its own.22
In the little time that remained, Claiborne tried to sum up the DOJ's
position:
217. Idat691-92.
218. Idat697-98.

219. Idat698.
220. Kurland &Casper, supra note 192, at 701.
221. Id
222. Id
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we construe Section 1464, the only statute which really is involved in
this case, as one that cannot consistently, with the First Amendment, be
applied so as to ban absolutely, for any substantial period of time, the
airing of particular words on radio or television, wholly without regard
to circumstances or to the context. 2

Justice Powell asked if it was fair for the DOJ to "construe what the
Commission actually held so sweepingly" when neither the FCC nor Judge
Leventhal saw it that way.22 Claiborne replied:
Mr. Justice Powell, I fear it is. Judge Leventhal sought to save the
Commission's order by narrowing it, and the Commission rides his
coattails.
But the order, which is what is before the Court and not counsel's
representation of it, is very clear that the Carlin dialog was not judged
except only in so far as it contained certain words. Those words,
regardless of how they were spoken or the manner in which they were
spoken, regardless of the surrounding words, were adjudged by the
Commission to be indecent language. The definition of indecent
language, which the Commission gave was clearly one which did not
have any relation to the context. They ruled that indecent language
could in no circumstances, except perhaps after 10 o'clock in the
evening, be redeemed by its context.25
Justice Powell then asked whether the FCC could act if such language
226
aired on Saturday morning, which is "prime time for small children.1
Claiborne said the FCC could if it could show that children were watching
and the program was intended for children. Justice Stevens asked whether,
if the Court adopted Judge Leventhal's view and said that "all that is before
us is the broadcast," the DOJ would still take the position that the FCC
acted unconstitutionally. 2 Claiborne said that it would. 2
Marino got up to give his rebuttal:
Yesterday in his argument, Mr. Plotkin, and this morning in his
argument, Mr. Claiborne, keep referring to the Commission's order as
banning, suppressing. We thought the Commission's order makes it

very clear that it wasn't banning, it wasn't adopting a flat ban, that it
was trying to channel this material to periods when there wouldn't be a
229

reasonable risk that children would be exposed to it.
Marino insisted that the FCC' s action did not constitute censorship.
He explained:
when Congress wrote 326, it quickly added at the end of it that it will
be unlawfuil to use "any obscene, indecent or profane language by
223. Id at 703.
224. Id at 704.
225. Id.

226. Id at 706-07.
227. Id at 707.
228. Id.

229. Id at 708.
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means of radio communications." That was written in by the same
people who wrote the section in 1927. And so when we approach these
cases, we have Congress' indication in 326 itself that we should
concern ourselves.23
One of the Justices asked whether it was "the Commission's position
that if the Commission regards something as indecent, profane or obscene,
its expert judgment . . . then it's entirely outside the prohibition against
censorship? 2 3 1 Marino explained that it was not the FCC' s view that
mattered, but whether "those words are found to be patently offensive by

contemporary

community

standards

in that

community.

,22

justice

Marshall asked:
What about this community you keep mentioning? All I have heard
argued here today is one protest, by one man, with one son-am I
right?
MR. MARINO: We only received one complaint, Your Honor, that's
correct.
THE COURT: Well, where do you get community action out of one
man? He wasn't the mayor, was he?
MR. MARINO: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
THE COURT: He didn't speak for the community, did he?
Mr. MARINO: He certainly did, Your Honor. He came in in a
representative capacity, we think. We've beenTHE COURT: [W]hat made you think that? You've only got one.
MR. MARINO: One citizen can raise a legitimate public interest
questionTHE COURT: Well, if you've got one citizen, that doesn't give you
the right to say he speaks for the community, does it?
THE COURT: [A]m I correct that if nobody had protested, you
wouldn't have taken action?
MR. MARINO: We wouldn't have known about it, Your Honor,
because . .. we just don't have the funds or . .. even instructions to
monitor. So we would have never known about it, except [for] a citizen
bringing this to our attention.
THE COURT [Chief Justice Burger]: Well, I suppose one citizen can
call the attention of the police department or the fire department to a
nuisance, and that triggers the procedures; is that what you're
suggesting?
23 3
THE COURT [Justice Marshall]: Well, this wasn't a fire !
Again, the courtroom broke into laughter. In closing, Marino stressed

230. Id. at 709-10.
231. Id. at 710.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 711-12.
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the narrowness of the FCC's ruling:
I don't understand why the United States feels that they have to expand
the Commission's order to reach constitutional questions, when it
could have been read very narrowly, as it was by Judge Leventhal, and
as it was by the Commissioners, who instructed us to come and seek
cert before this Court on the basis of Judge Leventhal's opinion,
knowing that we were going to rely on that opinion.23
Henry Geller, who attended the first day of oral argument, told me

that he was certain the FCC would lose .235

Not

only did he think the FCC

was wrong on the merits, but Plotkin's argument was direct and easy to
understand, while Marino got stage fight and did not argue well.2 3
Similarly, Richard Bodorff, who had worked on the FCC's brief in the D.C.
Circuit, had expected the FCC to lose in the Supreme Court. 3 He clearly
recalls hearing from his FCC friends who attended the argument that they
were sure that the FCC had lost at the Supreme Court. 3

.

The Conference After OralArgumen t

At the conference held two days later on April 2 1, five Justices voted
to overturn the D.C. Circuit (Burger, Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and
Stevens), and four voted to affirm (Brennan, Stewart, White, and
Marshall) .23 9 However, Justice Powell's notes indicated that the vote to
,,240
reverse was "tentative.
The Justices vote in order of seniority. Chief Justice Burger voted to
reverse, stating that he agreed with Judge Leventhal.2 4 Justice Brennan
voted to affirm even though he did not agree with any of the three opinions
below.24 He observed that while government has greater power to regulate
with regard to children, such regulation had to be narrowly framed, and
here it was not.2 4 The FCC could properly prohibit the broadcast of the
234.
235.
236.
237.
2009).
238.

239.

Idat 713.
Geller Interview, supra note 25.
Id
Telephone Interview with Richard J. Bodorff, Partner, Wiley Rein LLP (July 29,
Id.
THE SUPREME COURT I CONFERENCE

(1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DiscussioNs
'372-74 (Del Dickson ed., 2001)

BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
[hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE].

240. Notes of Justice Powell from April 21 Conference (April 21, 1978) (on file in
Powell Papers) [hereinafter Powell Conference Notes].'*

24 1.

TH-E SUPREME COURT INCONFERENCE, supra note

239, at 373.

242. According to the Powell Conference Notes, supra note 240, Brennan thought that
Judge Leventhal might be correct in reading Miller as going beyond Roth, but he was
unconvinced. Brennan could not agree with Judge Tammn because he thought section 326's
anticensorship provision was congruent with the First Amendment. Id.
243. Powell Conference Notes, supra note 240.
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Carlin monologue on a children's program, but most children would be in
school at 2:00 p.m. To survive, the FCC would need to spell out the
restriction as to time and content.
Justices Stewart, White, and Marshall also voted to affirm. Justice
Stewart thought the case turned on the meaning of § 1464.2 Since the
Court had previously construed similar language in § 1464 to require
material to be "obscene" before allowing it to be suppressed under the First
Amendment, he thought the Court was required to construe § 1464 in the
same way. 25Justice White thought the FCC lacked jurisdiction to bar
anything short of obscene.24 Justice Marshall thought the FCC was
engaging in censorship in violation of the First Amendment and the Court's
decision in CBS v. DNC.24
Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist joined the Chief Justice in
voting to reverse. Justice Blackmun observed that the "FCC's order was
24
not a very good one, and Leventhal tried to save it. I come out with him." 1
Justice Powell agreed that Leventhal was "on target" and "right" to
"construe what the decision is as narrowly as possible. 4 Justice Stevens
noted that he had:
flip-flopped on this case and may do so again. This is TV and radio,
and the government has greater latitude to regulate them than in
newspapers. So even if this material would be protected in newspapers.
even apart from protecting children anything that goes into my living
room under TV and radio may be regulated in the public interest. So
constitutionally, I would sanction this ban as Leventhal says. We
should also accept the FCC representation that Leventhal correctly

read its order.250
244.

THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 239, at 373.
245. Id.
246. Notes of Justice Blackmun from April 21 Conference (April 21, 1978) (on file in
Blackmun Papers) [hereinafter Blackmun Conference Notes]. He also thought that this case
was different from Red Lion. Id.
247. Columbia Brdcst. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); see THE
SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 239, at 373.
248. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 239, at 373. Powell's notes on
Justice Blackmun's vote are similar to Brennan's: "Leventhal did good job of saving this
order. Disagrees with PS as to 1464." Powell Conference Notes, supra note 240. Justice
Powell also reported that Justice Rehnquist "[a]grees with Leventhal. FCC has general
public interest powers so long as I' Amend is not violated." Id.
249. Blackmun Conference Notes, supra note 246. Powell read from the Solicitor
General's brief, which he thought was "outrageous." Id.
250. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 239, at 373. Blackmun's and
Powell's notes provide similar accounts. For example, the first line of Blackmun's notes
under Stevens's name reads: "Has flipflopped & may do so again." Blackmun Conference
Notes, supra note 246. He further notes: "HL [Leventhal] correct. Keep it narrow: this
particular [broadcast]." Id. But it was "hard to give a [different] meaning to § 1464 than to §
1461," a reference to the statutes at issue in Hamling. Id The last line notes that Stevens
was "still uncertain on the [statute]." Id. Powell's notes indicate that Stevens voted to
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Drafting the Opinions

Justice Stevens was assigned to draft the decision for the Court.
Justice Powell drafted a concurring opinion. Justices Stewart and Brennan
drafted dissents. Although drafts of each opinion were circulated among all
the Justices, very few substantive changes were made between the initial
drafts and the published opinions. This is likely due to the short amount of
time left in the term.
1.

Justice Stevens's First Draft

Justice Stevens circulated his first draft on June 14, only nineteen
days before the decision was announced. The introduction framed the issue
as whether the FCC "has any power to regulate the broadcast of recorded
material that is indecent but not obscene,1 5 '1and set forth four questions.
Part I addressed whether the scope of judicial review encompasses
more than the FCC's determination that the monologue was indecent "as
broadcast. 252 It stressed that the FCC's decision resulted from an
adjudication, not a rulemaking, and was issued in a specific factual context.
It also noted that the Court reviews judgments, not statements in
opinions. 5
Part 11 addressed whether the FCC' s action violated section 326 of the
Communications Act, which denies the FCC the power to censor
broadcasting. 5 After reviewing the statutory history and case law, the
draft concluded that section 326 denied the FCC the power to edit in
advance but not to review the content of completed broadcasts . 255
Moreover, section 326 was not intended to limit the FCC's power to
regulate the broadcast of indecent language. 5
Part III addressed "whether the afternoon broadcast of the 'Filthy
Words' monologue was indecent within the meaning of § 1464.~~5
Although Pacifica conceded that the monologue was offensive, it
contended that it was not indecent within the meaning of § 1464 because it

lacked prurient appeal .25 1 part III found that the plain language of the
statute did not support Pacifica's argument:
"[r]everse (tentative as to construction of statute)," and that "Electronic media is different.
Also children are different." Powell Conference Notes, supra note 240.
251. Draft Opinion by Justice John P. Stevens 1 (June 14, 1978) (on file in Blackmun
Papers) [hereinafter Stevens Draft Opinion].
252. Id. at 7.
253. Id. at 7.
254. Id. at 8.
255. Id. at8,l11.
256. Idatl11.
257. Id. at 12.
258. See id. at 13.
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The words "obscene, indecent, or profane" are written in the
disjunctive, implying that each has a separate meaning. Prurient appeal
is an element of the obscene, but the normal definition of "indecent"
merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality.
The Comnmission is clearly correct in its view that the statutory
prohibition was not intended by Congress to be limited to prurient
matter.25
Part IV addressed Pacifica's constitutional claims. First, it rejected the
overbreadth argument because "our review is limited to the question
whether the Commission has the authority to prescribe this particular
broadcast. 260 It dismissed concerns that some broadcasters would censor
themselves: "At most . . . the Commission's definition of indecency will
deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive references to excretory
and sexual organs and activit 'ies. While some of these references may be
26
protected, they surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern.", 1
Next, the opinion stated that "[w]hen the issue is narrowed to the facts
of this case, the question is whether the First Amendment denies
government any power to restrict the public broadcast of indecent language
in any circumstances. For if the government has any such power, this was
an appropriate occasion for its exercise., 6 After a review of the case law,
it concluded that the First Amendment did not prohibit all regulation of
speech that depends on content. 6 The draft acknowledged that speech
could not be suppressed just because it was offensive or because of its
political content.2 It also assumed that the Carlin monologue had artistic
value and would be protected in other contexts .265 But here, the words were
offensive "for the same reason that obscenity offends. 6
The draft explained that the Court has "long recognized that each
259. Id. at 13 (footnote omitted). The last sentence of this passage was not included in
the published opinion. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739-40 (1978).
260. Stevens Draft Opinion, supra note 251, at 16. The opinion noted that its approach
was consistent with its action in Red Lion, rejecting the claim that the FCC's Fairness
Doctrine was too vague. Id. at 16-17:
261. Id. at 17 (footnote omitted). The footnote observed that the primary impact would
be "on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are not too many
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language." Id at 17 n. 18. The
next sentence, which does not appear in the published versions, went on to note that
humorists would probably be most affected, but that it has been long understood that the
appropriateness of some forms of humor depend on the setting. Id
262. Id. at 18 (footnote omitted). Footnote 19 noted that adopting Pacifica's position
would deprive the FCC of any power to regulate erotic telecasts unless they were obscene
under the Miller test. It also rejected Pacifica's assurances that market forces would keep
smut off the air, quoting Judge Leventhal's dissent. Id at 18~ n. 19.
263. Id at 19-20.
264. Idat 20.
265. Id. at 21.
266. Id at 20.
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medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems" and
that broadcasting has received the most limited protection under the First
Amendment. 6 Two characteristics of broadcasting were particularly
relevant here:
First, the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent
material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in
public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right
to be let alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
intruder. Rowan v. Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728. Because the
broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings
cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected
program content. To say that one may avoid further offense by turning
off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow....
Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those
too young to read. Although Cohen's written message might have been
incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica's broadcast could have
enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant... . We held in Ginsberg v.
New York,' 390 U.S. 629, that the government's interest in the "well
being of its youth" and in supporting "parents' claim to authority in
their own household" justified the regulation of otherwise protected
expression. Id. at 640 and 639. The ease with which children may
obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns
recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of indecent
268
broadcasting.
The final paragraph emphasized the narrowness of the holding. It did
"6not involve a conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher or a

telecast of an Elizabethan comedy." 269

It

stressed that the FCC's action

"rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is allimportant.. .. We simply hold that when the Commission finds that a pig
has entered the parlor, its regulatory power does not depend on proof that
the pig is obscene." 7
The Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist quickly joined Justice
Stevens's opinion.2 7 Justice Stewart advised Justice Stevens that he would
267. Id at 22 (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952)).
268. Stevens Draft Opinion, supra note 251, at 23-25 (footnote omitted). Footnote 27
rejected the claim that the FCC's action reduced adults to hearing only what was fit for
children, noting that adults could purchase tapes and records, go to nightclubs and theaters,
and perhaps, because the FCC had not decided this question, even listen to such
programming broadcast in the late evening hours. Id. at 25 n.27.
269. Id. at 25.
270. Id. at 25-26.
271. The Chief Justice's only suggestion was to add a citation to Office of Comm. of
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (1966). Letter from the Chief Justice to
Justice Stevens (June 16, 1978) (on file in Blackmun Papers). The published opinion cites
that case to support the point that the FCC was not prevented from denying the license
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be circulating a dissent, and both Justices White and Marshall indicated
they would await the dissent. 7 To obtain a majority, Justice Stevens
needed the support of both Justice Powell and Justice Blackmun. But both
had concerns with Justice Stevens's draft. Justice Blackmnun' s clerk advised
him that "there may be some problems joining JPS's Pacifica opinion as
written, because he resorts to the 'semi-protected speech'/zoning theory
that you rejected in joining [Stewart's] dissent in Young v. American Mini
Theatres. 27 3 Similarly, Justice Powell's clerk advised him that "[a]lthough
there is much in this opinion with which you can agree, you may. . . have
some trouble joining all of part IV.,, 274 Justice Stevens had made many of
the same points he made in Part 11 of American Mini Theaters,275 which
Justice Powell "pointedly did not join," and "he beat[] the drum loud and
long for the proposition that government can regulate speech on the basis
of its content." 27 ' Alt observed that Justice Stevens's approach "simply
carries one step further what the Court has been doing all along," because
the Court looks to content to decide whether the speech is protected. 277 But
because it required the Court to decide the value of speech, it created the
"danger ... that the justices' own varying values will feed into the decision
too much." 27 8 Justice Powell underlined this sentence and wrote "yes" next
renewal of a broadcast station for improper programming. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 737 (1978). The UCC decision was written by Burger when he was on the D.C. Circuit.
It held that listeners and viewers had standing to raise objections to a station's
programming, in this case, that the station had failed to comply with the Fairness Doctrine
and engaged in racially discriminatory programming, and that the FCC was required to
consider those objections in determining whether to grant the license renewal. UCC, 359
F.2d at 1007-09.
272. Letter from Justice Stewart to Justice Stevens (June 15, 1978) (on file in Blackmun
Papers); Letter from Justice White to Justice Stevens (June 15, 1978) (on file in Blackmun
Papers); Letter from Justice Marshall to Justice Stevens (June 16, 1978) (on file in
Blackmun Papers). Justice Stewart circulated his draft dissent on June 16.
273. Memorandum from Ruth Glushien, Clerk to Justice Blackmun, to Justice Blackmun
(June 16, 1978) (on file in Blackmun Papers).
274. Memorandum from Jim Alt, Clerk to Justice Powell, to Justice Powell 1 (June 16,
1978) (on file in Powell Papers) [hereinafter Alt's June 16th Memo to Powell]. Alt
described Part 1I as holding that section 326 means no more than that the FCC may not
exercise prior restraint. He was "a little surprised to find that the opinion does not hold that
the sweep of § 326 is the same as that of the First Amendment" because the meaning of the
First Amendment had changed since the time section 326 was enacted in 1927. Id at 1-2.
But even if section 326 were "viewed as static, the First Amendment itself always will be
available to challenge FCC actions that arguably infringe on broadcasters' rights, but do not
constitute 'prior restraints."' Id. Justice Powell wrote "yes" in the margin next to this
sentence. Id. at 2.
275. Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
276. Alt's June 16th Memo to Powell, supra note 274, at 2. Powell inserted by hand the
phrase "but TV & Radio only" after the word "regulate." Id
277. Id. at 4.
278. Id
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to it."' 9
Alt noted that "[tlhere is a parallel to be drawn" to the debate in equal
protection law as to whether to apply only the "strict scrutiny" and
"rational relation" tests, or Justice Marshall's "sliding scale. 8 If Justice
Powell was "not inclined to adopt the 'sliding scale' approach to the First
Amendment - which, I gather from your Mini Theaters concurrence, you
may not be - the problem remains as to what to do here." 281 Alt did not
think the Court could hold that Carlin's language was unprotected
altogether. Thus, he recommended emphasizing three points: (1) the FCC's
holding did not bar adults from access to Carlin's record but was like the
zoning upheld in Mini Theaters; (2) the Court had recognized the value of
protecting children from "objectionable but protected speech" in Ginsberg
v. New York,28 and radio was uniquely accessible to children; and (3) the
speech here was "akin to a 'verbal assault' even to some adults. 8
Alt concluded that while the case was difficult to decide without some
reference to content, it was not "necessary to downplay the Court's
tradition that the degree of protection due speech should not depend on the
content of speech quite so much as Justice Stevens does." 284 He suggested
that since Justice Stevens needed Justice Powell's vote, it might be possible
to get Justice Stevens to remove portions of his opinion, and if not, Powell
285
might wish to write his own opinion.
A few days later, Glushien reported to Justice Blackmun that the
current lineup was three to three, but Powell had not yet voted and was
planning to write a concurring opinion. She noted:
My own recommendation in the case has to be of a first order/second
order kind, since our views on this case have been conscientiously
different. I still would be inclined to affirm CADC on First
Amendment grounds because I am not at all sure how one
between George Carlin's monologue and such works
distinguishes ...
of serious literary merit as Joyce's Molly Brown soliloquy in Ulysses,
the work of Henry Miller or D.H. Lawrence, several portions of
Samuel Beckett's plays, Miguel Pinero's Short Eyes play about prison
life, or indeed some of the bawdier punning parts of Shakespeare.28
Recognizing that the Justice would not likely agree, she continued:
However, assuming you are still inclined to reverse and thus uphold
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
1 (June

Id.
Id.
Id at 4-5.
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
Alt's June 16th Memo to Powell, supra note 274, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id
Memorandum from Ruth Glushien, Clerk to Justice Blackmun, to Justice Blackmun
18. 1978).
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the Commission's order, I would recommend that we await, and most
probably join LFP's concurrence in the judgment of reversal, rather
than JPS's opinion. This is because JPS's opinion relies so heavily on
his American Mini Theatres theory which you did not join, that there is
a middle category of "peripherally protected" speech. His theory is that
"offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities,"
while non-obscene, "surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment
concerns" and thus deserve only limited First Amendment protections.
. PS's theory . . .would seemingly apply to books, magazines,
plays, and phonograph records as well as to television/radio
broadcasts. It ignores that fact, which I think important, that emphatic
rough language can at times be used conscientiously by an artist in
portraying certain ethos and ways of life, and that the ability to use
such language where artistically necessary is an important First
Amendment value.28
She notes that Powell's concurrence would "be based on two
narrower factors: the unique intrusiveness of broadcast into the home, and
the problem of involuntary exposure of children to broadcasting. 2 88 She
viewed the Powell approach as superior because it was "not capable of

such easy transplantation to other media.
2.

289

Justice Powell's Concurring Opinion
Justice Powell circulated his draft concurrence on June 19, 1978. Part

I explained his reasons for upholding the FCC. He emphasized that the
FCC's primary concern was to prevent this broadcast, which the FCC
correctly found "'patently offensive' to most people regardless of age" and
"4was at least wholly without taste," from reaching unsupervised children
who were likely to be in the audience at 2:00 p.m.290 He supported the
FCC's effort to "zone" the monologue to hours when few unsupervised

children would be exposed to

it.29i1

He noted that:

children may not be able to protect themselves from speech which,

although shocking to most adults, generally may be avoided by the
287. Id. at 2./
2 88. Id. at 3.
289. Id
290. Draft Concurring Opinion by Justice Lewis F. Powell 3 (June 19, 1978) (on file in
Powell Papers) [hereinafter Powell Draft]. I also found an earlier, uncirculated draft in the
Powell Papers. This draft had several deletions, additions, and corrections in Justice
Powell's handwriting. For example, on the first page, he deleted a sentence that read, "Since
I expect the Commission to proceed in a cautious and reasonable manner in the future, as it
has done in the past, cf. Brief for Petitioner 42-43, 1 do not foresee an undue 'chilling'
effect on broadcasters' exercise of their rights." On page three, he added in reference to the
Carlin monologue, "it was at least, however, wholly without taste." On page eight, he
inserted a new sentence acknowledging that making judgments was not easy, but that "[the]
responsibility ha[d] been reposed initially in the FCC and its expert judgment [was] entitled
to respect." Powell Draft, supra note 290, at 8.
291. Powell Draft, supra note 290, at 8.
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unwilling through the exercise of judicious choice. At the same time,
a deeper and more lasting negative effect on a
such speech may have
292
child than an adult.
While in many cases, dissemination of such speech to children could be
limited without also limiting the access of willing adults, it was not
possible in broadcasting, and this distinction justified the differential
treatment of broadcasting. 9
Another relevant difference was that "broadcasting - unlike most
other forms of communication - comes directly into the home, the one
place where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted by
uninvited and offensive sights and sound." 294 While the First Amendment
might require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of offensive but
protected speech when they are in public, "a different order of values
295
obtains in the home."

Finally, although the argument that the FCC' s ruling reduced adults to
hearing only what was fit for children was "not without force," it was "not
sufficiently strong to leave the Commission powerless to act" in these
circumstances. 9 The, FCC's decision did not prevent willing adults from
obtaining access to the Carlin monologue, nor did it "speak to cases
involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word in the course of a
radio broadcast, as distinguished from the linguistic shock treatment
administered by respondent here." 9
of
In Part 11, Justice Powell explained why he did not join in Part WV
Justice Stevens's opinion addressing the constitutional claims. He did not
believe that the Court should "decide on the basis of its content which
speech protected by the First Amendment is most 'valuable' and hence
deserving of the most protection, and which is less 'valuable' and hence
deserving of less protection. 298 Rather, the result should turn "instead on
the unique characteristics of the broadcast media, combined with society's
right to protect its children from speech agreed to be inappropriate for their
years, and secondarily with the interest of unwilling adults in not being
assaulted by such offensive speech in their homes." 9 Justice Blackmun
quickly joined Justice Powell's concurring opinion after Justice Powell
agreed to make some minor changes. 00
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at 4.
Idat5.
Id at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id at 9.
Id. at 9-10. (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976)).
Id at 10.
Letter from Justice Blackmun to Justice Powell (June 20, 1978) (on file in
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The next day, Justice Stevens sent a personal letter to Justice Powell
with a copy to Justice Blackmun:
Because you indicated that you might be able to join in portions of
Part IV, I have broken it into three subsections. I think everything with
which you took issue is in subpart B....
To a certain extent the review of overbreadth analysis in subpart A
rests on the premise that this speech in not very important and
therefore your problems with subpart B may carry over to subpart A as
well. Nevertheless, I would hope that you would at least think about
joining subpart A because it is an important part of the picture. I
believe, also, that it is consistent with the analysis in Harry's opinion in
Bates.
Some of my changes are the product of further thinking prompted by
your concurrence, but I do not mean to take issue with anything you
have said and will welcome any suggestions you care to make
notwithstanding our rather narrow area of disagreement.
Thank goodness we are at last on the home stretch."' 1
Blackmun's clerk described Justice Stevens' changes as "mostly
cosmetic," and recommended against joining Subparts A, B, and C unless
Powell had "strong feelings about wishing to make a gesture to
[Stevens]. 0 Ultimately, both Justices Powell and Blackmun joined Parts
1, 11, 1II, and IV(C) of Justice Stevens's opinion, providing him with the
votes he needed to reverse the D.C. Circuit and affirm the FCC.
3.

The Dissenting Opinions

Justice Stewart circulated the first draft of his dissent on June 16. The
published opinion is not significantly changed from this initial draft. Justice
Stewart thought the term "indecent" in § 1464 should be read as meaning
no more than "obscene. 3 He noted that the Court had recently held in
Hamling that the term "indecent" had the same meaning as "obscene" as
that term was defined in the Miller case, and nothing suggested that
Congress intended a different meaning.34H coluetht"siete
Carlin monologue concededly was not 'obscene,' I believe that the
Comm-ission lacked statutory authority to ban it," and it was thus
Blackmun Papers). Justice Blackmun suggested (1) deleting the word "judicious" from the
sentence quoted in the supra text accompanying note 293, explaining that "I suspect adults
have a choice whether it is or is not judicious." and (2) eliminating the citation to the Carey
case not only because he thought it was unnecessary but also because he was on the other
side in Carey. Id
301. Letter from Justice Stevens to Justice Powell (June 20, 1978) (on file in Blackmun
Papers).
302. Memorandum from Ruth Glushien, Clerk to Justice Blackmun, to Justice Blackmun
(June 21, 1978) (on file in Blackmun Papers).
303. Draft Dissenting Opinion by Justice John P. Stewart 3 (June 16, 1978) (on file in
Blackmun Papers).

304. Id. at 3, 4-5.

Number 1]

Number 1JPACIFICA
RECONSIDERED29

239

unnecessary to reach the constitutional question.'O
Justice Brennan advised the other justices on June 19 that he would
probably join Justice Stewart's dissent, but was also writing something on
the constitutional question. 0 On June 24, Brennan circulated his draft
dissent .3 He agreed with Justice Stewart that the word "indecent" in §
1464 prohibited only obscene speech. 0 Ordinarily, he would have
refrained from addressing the constitutional issues, but he found "the
Court's misapplication of fundamental First Amendment principles so
patent, and its attempt to impose its sadly myopic notions of propriety on
the whole of the American people so misguided, that I am unable to remain
silent." 09
Part I of the draft pointed out that despite unanimous agreement that
the Carlin monologue was protected speech and that a majority of the Court
refused to "create a sliding scale of First Amendment protection calibrated
to this Court's perception of the worth of a communication's content," the
majority found the FCC's imposition of sanctions for airing this speech
constitutional .3 '0 The majority also ignored the fact that individuals
voluntarily admitted radio communications into their homes and that,
unlike other invasive modes of communications such as sound trucks, the
radio could be turned off. It also ignored the constitutionally protected
interests of those who wished to transmit or receive broadcasts that the
FCC might find offensive.3 1
Although Justice Brennan recognized the government's interest in
protecting children, he thought this interest had already been accounted for
by the "variable obscenity standard" set forth in Ginsberg v. New York.3 1
Under that standard, the Carlin monologue was not obscene because it did
not appeal to the prurient interests of children. Moreover, he argued, while
both the Stevens opinion and prior cases "stress the time-honored right of a
parent to raise his child as he sees fit," this decision actually undermined
parents' rights to make decisions about what their children should be able
to hear.3 t
Justice Brennan also argued that the majority's attempt to justify its
305. Idat 2.
306. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Stevens (June 19, 1978) (on file in Powell
Papers) (copied to The Conference).
307. Draft Dissenting Opinion by Justice William J. Brennan (June 24, 1978) (on file in
Powell Papers) [hereinafter Brennan Draft].
308. Id. at 1.
309. Id at 1-2.
310. Idat3.
311. Id. at 6-7.
312. Id. at 9.
313. Id. at 13.
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decision based on the intrusive nature of broadcasting and the presence of

children in the audience both lacked "principled

liMits"3, 14

He notes that

"[tlaken to their logical extreme, these rationales would support the
cleansing of public radio of any 'four-letter' words whatsoever, regardless
of their context," and could justify the banning of a myriad of literary
works."' 5
Part 11 of the draft attacked his colleagues' assertion that their actions
would "not significantly infringe on the First Amendment values [as] both
disingenuous as to reality and wrong as a matter of law." 1 He thought that
Justice Stevens's claim that avoiding indecent language would affect only
the form, not substance of the communication was "transparently
fallacious," because "[a] given word may have a unique capacity to capsule
an idea, evoke an emotion, or conjure up an image., 1 Moreover, the claim
that willing adults were not prevented from purchasing the record or
attending a performance, displayed
a sad insensitivity to the fact that these alternatives involve the
expenditure of money, time, and effort that many of those wishing the
[sic] hear Mr. Carlin's message may not be able to afford, and a na~fve
innocence of318the reality that in many cases, the medium may well be

the message.

Brennan also found that Justices Stevens and Powell's opinions were
"disturbing" for evidencing
a depressing inability to appreciate that in our land of cultural
pluralism, there are many who think, act, and talk differently from the
members of this Court, and who do not share their fragile sensibilities.
It is only an acute ethnocentric myopia that enables the Court to
approve the censorship of communications solely because of the words

they contain.31
He noted that the words found unpalatable by the Court "may be the
stuff of everyday conversations in some, if not many, of the innumerable
subcultures that comprise this Nation., 32 0 Because the decision would have
the greatest impact on those who did not share the Court's views, it should
be seen as "another of the dominant culture's inevitable efforts to force
those groups who do not share its mores to conform to its way of thinking,
acting, and speaking." 2
314. Id. at 14. In footnote 4, Brennan agreed that the FCC's action was not justified by
spectrum scarcity. Spectrum scarcity could justify' regulation to increase diversity as in Red
Lion, but not to justify' censorship. Id. at 14 n.4
315. Id. at 15.
316. Id. at 18.
317. Id.
318. Idat20.
319. Brennan Draft, supra note 307, at 22.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 24.
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Reactions to Justice Brennan's Draft Dissent

Justice Powell and his clerks took offense to Justice Brennan's draft
dissent. A handwritten note from "Bob" attached to Justice Brennan's first
draft found in Justice Powell's files read: "This is the poorest, most selfimpeaching piece of drivel from their Chambers yet! I wish now that we
had left our Jewish quota language in." 2 Justice Powell wrote at the top of
the draft, "This is 'garbage'! 3 2 3 He circled phrases such as "sadly myopic
notions of propriety, ".
.fragile sensibilities," and "acute ethnocentric
myopia, 3 24 and underlined phrases such as "na~ve innocence of the
reality," "patently wrong result," "dangerous as well as lamentable," and
32
"depressing inability to appreciate that in our land of cultural pluralism. 1
Next to Justice Brennan's assertion that the majority rationale suffered
from "lack of principled limits," Justice Powell wrote, "This - by [the]
author of Bakke! p,~326
Alt's memo to Justice Powell characterized Justice Brennan's draft as
"intemperate in some places, smugly self-righteous in others, and
ludicrously overwritten in yet others. 2 But, he concluded that Justice
Brennan made no points worthy of reply and suggested only a few minor
changes to Justice Powell's draft. Alt's most substantive proposed
suggestion was to delete the observation that Carlin's monologue "was at
least wholly without taste" because it was in tension with Part 11, which
eschewed making value judgments. 2 Powell agreed, "Yes, I already had
decided this sentence was out-of-place. 329 Alt's memo concluded, "After
re-reading the three opinions in this case that deal with the constitutional
issues, I would immodestly venture the thought that yours makes the most
sense by an appreciable margin." To which Justice Powell replied, "I find it
33 0
difficult to disagree with this 'modest' assessment.
Justice Powell sent Justice Blackmun a copy of his revised
concurrence along with a cover note stating:
No doubt you have read Bill Brennan's dissent in which he pays his
"respects" to my dissent [sic] as well as the Court's opinion.

323. "Bob" is likely Robert D. Comfort, one of Justice Powell's clerks from 1977-1978.
323. Brennan Draft, supra note 307, at 1.
324. Id. at 2, 22.
325. Id. at 2 2.
326. Id. at 14.
327. Memorandum from Jim Alt, Clerk to Justice Powell, to Justice Powell 1 (June 25,
1978) (on file in Powell Papers) [hereinafter Alt Memo on Brennan Dissent].
3 28. Id
329. Id. Alt also suggested deleting a reference to what most people think because it
seemed to express a personal view and the concurrence would be stronger without it, to
which Powell responded "So do L." Id.
3 30. Id. at 2.
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Perhaps you will not wish to be associated with an opinion said to
display "acute ethnocentric myopia,... a sad insensitivity", and "naive
innocence of reality". 33
Justice Blackmun replied that "Writings of late, particularly in dissent,
demonstrate once again that we are at the end of a term." 3
Justice Brennan recirculated his draft on June 29. Most of the
language that offended Justice Powell remained in this as well as the
published version. 3 Indeed, Justice Powell wrote across the top of the
recirculated draft: "File & keep in file as example of how not to write an
334
opinion.5

V. REACTION TO THE PAacCA DECISION
The Court issued its decision at the end of the term on July 3, 1978 .~
It received decidedly mixed reviews in the press, at the FCC, and by legal
scholars.

A.

The Press
On July 5, Washington Post television critic

Tom Shales
characterized the Court's decision as "unthinkable" and "stupefying. 536He

wrote:
That the First Amendment is being trampled in such a decision,
announced on the eve of the Fourth of July, is obvious. But then, it's
already obvious that the First Amendment is not one that the Burger
Court holds in high regard.
Possible deleterious effects of the decision are more disturbing still.
The Supreme Court has given managements and owners of TV and
radio stations terrific new ammunition to use against reporters, news
directors, producers and writers who want to put potentially explosive
or controversial material on the air.
331. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Blackmun (June 26, 1978) (on file in
Blackmun Papers).
332. Letter from Justice Blackmun to Justice Powell (June 26, 1978) (on file in Powell
Papers).
333. The phrase "sadly myopic" was omitted in the second printed draft circulated June
30 and in the published version. Second Printed Draft Dissenting Opinion by Justice
William J. Brennan, No. 77-528, (June 30, 1978) (on file in Marshall Papers). However, the
other language that Justice Powell objected to remained.
334. First Printed Draft Opinion by Justice William J. Brennan I (June 29, 1978) (on file
in Powell Papers). Justice Powell underlined passages and wrote comments in the margin on
this draft as well. For example, he again noted, "strange words from the author of the
Brennan plurality in Bakke." Id. at 9. Next to a passage reading "for those of us who place
an appropriately high value on our cherished First Amendment rights, the word 'censor' is
such a word[,]" Justice Powell wrote "Pious." Id. at 12.
335. On October 2, 1978, it denied rehearing. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 439 U.S. 726, 883
(1978).
336. Tom Shales, 'Seven Dirty Words' and the Burger Court... Free Speech, the FCC
and TV Censorship, WASH.

POST,

July 5, 1978, at Bi, B7.
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And the Court has given the FCC, of all the all-thumbs regulatory
agencies, new power to harass and intimidate TV and radio stations
whose counterculture, antiestablishment or just offbeat programming
may include vocabularies acceptable to their electronic constituencies
but offensive to little old ladies, elderly judges, near and far right
wingers, or parents unable to regulate the listening and viewing habits
of their kiddies.
The stations most endangered will be the struggling, minorityinterest, fringe stations who can least afford expensive lawyers to
defend them against the FCC. 13
Two days later, however, a Washington Post editorial agreed with the
Supreme Court's decision.
All heck has broken loose in the radio and television world this week
as a result of the Supreme Court's decision Monday in the case
involving seven naughty words. The outcome was unexpected. The
court, according to many experts, had been regarded as almost certain
to hold unconstitutional the warning the Federal Communications
Commission had given a radio station for broadcasting a 12-minutelong monologue in which those bad words were used over and over
again. But the justices didn't go according to form; they upheld the
warning by a vote of 5 to 4. We are glad they did.
This is one of those cases that never should have reached either the
Supreme Court or the FCC. The monologue-recorded in a California
theater by comedian George Carlin-may be regarded as funny by
some; the transcript indicates he was interrupted 83 times by laughter
or applause. But its prime appeal is its shock value ... . Even as part of
a program about society's attitude toward language-which is the way
the station owner, Pacifica Foundation, described its use-the
monologue did not belong on the air, as a matter of policy, in mid-

afternoon. 338

The editorial disagreed that the decision opened the door for
substantial censorship since neither Justice Stevens nor Justice Powell
suggested "that the FCC should require that the occasional dirty word be
bleeped out or that programming should always be aimed only at family
audiences."'" 9 However, the New York Times editorialized against the
decision, noting that "[g]overnment action of this sort, however moderate,
tends to make us uneasy .... ,,340

B.

The FCC

The FCC Chairman Charles D. Ferris, a Democrat, did not agree with
the Supreme Court's decision. According to Ferris's chief of staff, Frank
Lloyd, Ferris said,
337. Id. at Bi.
338. Editorial, Seven Naughty Words, WASH.

POST, July 7,

339. Id.
340. Editorial, Cleaning Up After Dirty Words, N.Y.

TIMES,

1978, at Al8.
July 31, 1978, at A14.
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let's find the first possible indecency complaint that comes in and
make it clear that that case will never reoccur at the FCC. There's an
infinitesimal chance of FCC ever coming out with a ruling that
something is indecent.
So we went down to the Media Bureau-Broadcast Bureau at that
time-and said send us all of your complaints and we'll pick one. And
we picked one against WGBH, the Boston public TV station for a
rendition of Molly Bloom's
soliloquy in Ulysses which had all the
34 1

seven dirty words in it.

Within a matter of weeks, the FCC issued an unanimous ruling in
favor of WGBH 3. The FCC distinguished this case from Pacifica because
petitioner "made no comparable showing of abuse by WGBH-TV of its
programming discretion. 3 43 It also stated its intention to "construe the
Pacifica holding consistent with the paramount importance we attach to
encouraging free-ranging programming and editorial discretion by
broadcasters." 3
The same month, Ferris told the New England Broadcasting
Association that he would consider it "'.a tragedy' if the Supreme Court's
recent decision on the use of indecent language on television and radio
were to become a reason for broadcasters to avoid controversy. 345 He
asserted that the recent WGBH case demonstrated that "the [FCC] is not
going to become a censor." 346 Ferris stressed that Pacifica would apply
only to situations where the facts were "virtually recreated" and in his
view, "[tlhe particular set of circumstances in the Pacifica case is about as
347
likely to occur again as Halley's Comet.
While Ferris was not on the FCC when it issued the Pacifica
341. Frank Lloyd, Former FCC Chief of Staff, Comments Made at a Presentation at the
Historical Society for the District of Columbia Circuit, FCC Indecency Cases in the D.C.
Circuit: An Historical Perspective (Oct. 15, 2008). A webcast of this program is available at

Videos

of Society Programs,HISTOICAL SOCIETY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT,

http://www.dcchs.orglnews/videos.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (Lloyd's remarks start
approximately seven minutes into segment labeled Discussion and Conclusion).
342. WGBH Educational Foundation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 69 F.C.C.2d
1250 (1978). Morality in Media had filed a petition to deny the license renewal of WGBH,
alleging that WGBH had "failed in its responsibility to the community by consistently
broadcasting offensive, vulgar and otherwise material harmful to children without adequate
supervision or parental warnings." Id. at para. 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
programs complained of included an episode of Masterpiece Theater and Monty Python's
Flying Circus. Id.
343. Id. at para. 10.
344. Id. at para. 11.
345. Les Brown, Ferris Says F.CC Will Not Act as Censor of Controversial Issues,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1978, at 34.
346. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
347. Jeff Demas, Seven Dirty Words. Did They Help Define Indecency?, 20 Comm. & L.
39, 51 (1998). Democratic Commissioner Tyrone Brown delivered a similar message in his
speech to the Oklahoma Broadcasters Association. Id. at 49.
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Declaratory Order, Commissioner Abbott Washburn was. He disagreed
with the New York Times editorial that the Pacifica decision should make
one "uneasy. 348 He asserted that Justice Stevens's "carefully drafted
opinion [was] an important and welcome clarification" of the meaning of §
1464 and the definition of "indecent language," and that the overwhelming
majority of the American public would agree that the Carlin broadcast was

indecent. 34
In a speech to the Federal Communications Bar Association,
Washburn defended the Pacifica decision while assuring his audience that
the FCC "ha[d] no intention of going on a regulatory spree as a
consequence. 350 He did not think that the Pacifica decision would lead to
timidity in programming. 35'1But given the awesome power of television as
a "socializing force comparable to the school, the church, even the home,"
broadcasters had special responsibilities. 5
He compared industry
"spokesmen deploring their orphan status with respect to the First
Amendment" to "an orange wanting to be a banana. 353 He reminded
broadcasters that the spectrum they used was a limited resource and there
were "considerable advantages to being an orange." 5 He asserted that
most broadcasters were not concerned about the indecency prohibition
since they would not use such words in any event. 5
C

Academic Reaction

Most academic articles criticized the Supreme Court's decision. For
example, the Harvard Law Review's end-of-term review portrayed the
majority's reasoning as inconsistent, the privacy argument as makeweight,
and the protection-of-children rationale as lacking support. 5 It also
criticized Justice Stevens's sliding scale approach for ignoring the emotive
impact of speech .35" The review concluded that unless the Court confined
348. Abbott Washburn, Letter to the Editor, 'Seven Dirty Words' and the Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1978, at A26. Commissioner Washburn sent a copy of this letter to Justice

Blackmun (on file in Blackmun Papers).
349. Id.
350. Washburn Speech, supra note 68, at 4.
351. Id. at 10.
352. Id. at 8.
353. Id. at 10.
354. Id. at 10-11.

355. Washburn Speech, supra note 68, at 12.
356. The Supreme Court 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REv. 57, 157-162 (1978) [hereinafter
1977 Term]; see also Case Conmment FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: An Indecent (Speech)
Decision? (George Carlin's "Filthy Words"), 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 155 (1979) (arguing that the
Pacifica decision would have a chilling effect and threatened the vitality of the First
Amendment).
357. 1977 Term, supra note 356, at 156.
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its decision to this extraordinarily limited context, it would pose a "serious
setback for those who prize our pluralistic society's commitment to the free
exchange of ideas. 5
A case note in the Boston College Law Review found it "surprising
that the Court in Pacifica chose to uphold the right of a citizen to insulate
himself at the cost of the rights of other persons to transmit and receive the
broadcast," especially since one could easily avoid offense by turning off
the radio .359 That author also found it troubling that by disregarding all but
one of the Miller elements (offensiveness), the Court effectively imposed a
harsher standard for protected indecent speech than for unprotected
obscene speech. Because few children were likely listening to the radio at
2:00 p.m., it was difficult "to conceive of a fact pattern which would be
more appropriate than the one in this case to trigger this adult standard for
indecent speech."3 6 0 Moreover, by failing to assess the work as a whole,
failing to identify what community standards were applied, and taking no
expert testimony, the Pacifica Court "perpetuated the very absolutism and
3 61
imposed uniformity that the Court in Miller attempted to correct.
Finally, the author criticized the majority decision as leaving "in its wake
confusion, unpredictability, and serious questions concerning the
overbreadth of the standard and its constitutional limits" and as
"substantially infring[ing] . . . the constitutional rights of broadcasters,
recording artists, and listeners. 6

VI. FCC ENFORCEMENT OF INDECENCY PROHIBITION AFTER
PACIFICA

In the first ten years after Pacifica, the FCC "chose to use its
regulatory power simply to focus on broadcast uses of the 'seven dirty

358. Id. at 163.
359. Marcus, supra note 10, at 992.

360. Id. at 997.
36 1. Id. at 999.
362. Id. at 1000, 1002. Although the academic treatment of Pacifica over the past thirty
years is beyond the scope of this Article, the decision has few supporters. See, e.g., R.
Wilford Tremblay, FCC Y. Pacifica Foundation, in FREE SPEECH ON TRIAL:
COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVES ON LANDMARK SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 218-33
(Richard A. Parker ed., 2003). Many articles have argued against extending Paciica to
nonbroadcast media. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Marjorie L. Esterow, Censoring
Indecent Cable Programs: The New Morality Meets the New Media, 51 FoRDHAm L. REV.
606 (1983) (concluding that no acceptable interpretation of Pacifica would permit
government to exclude from cable even the most indecent nonobscene programming). In
fact, the Court did refuse to extend the Pacifica-type analysis to cable television in United
States v. Playboy Entm 't Group, 529 U.S.- 803, 815 (2000); to telephone dial-a-pom in Sable
Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1989); and to indecent content on the Internet in
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 866-67 (1997).
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words' identified in Pacifica. 363 In the early 1990s, the FCC created a safe
harbor for indecent broadcasts between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00
a.m.3M4 The FCC "made it a point to reassure broadcasters that fleeting
sexual references or depictions would not likely be problematic" and
indicated that it would wield its regulatory power with restraint. 365
The FCC's approach to indecency changed dramatically under the
administration of George W. Bush. The FCC used a complaint about
NBC's Golden Globe Awards program, which aired on January 19, 2003,
to announce its stricter policy against indecency. 366 Members of the Parents
Television Council (PTC) alleged that Bono's comment ("this is really,
really, flucking brilliant") violated § 1464 .67 The FCC's Enforcement
Bureau denied the complaint, finding that in context, the word "fucking"
did not describe sexual or excretory organs or activities, but was used "as
an adjective or expletive to emphasize an exclamation., 6
The full FCC, however, voted unanimously to overturn the Bureau's
decision. The FCC explained that indecency findings involved two separate
determinations:
First, the material alleged to be indecent must fall within the subject
matter scope of our indecency definition . . .. Second, the broadcast
must be patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium.
In making indecency determinations, the Commission has indicated
that the "fiull context in which the material appeared is critically
important," and has articulated three "principal factors" for its analysis:
"(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction
of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material
dwells on or repeats at length descriptions of sexual or excretory
organs or activities; (3) whether the material appears to pander or is
used to titillate, or whether the material appears to have been
3 69
presentedfor its shock value."

363. Lili Levi, The FCC's Regulation of Indecency,

7 FIRST REPORTS 1

(2008). The

Second Circuit's decision in Fox also contains a thorough description of the evolution of the
FCC's indecency policy. See Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 448-51 (2d Cir.
2007).
364. Levi, supra note 363, at 13. After several years of litigation, the D.C. Circuit
upheld the safe harbor in Action for Children's TV v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996).
365. Levi, supranote 363, at 2.
366. Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 19859,
para. 1 (2003).
367. Id. at paras. 2-3.
368. Id at para. 5.
369. Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975,
paras. 6-7 (2004) (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted) [hereinafter Golden
Globe].

248

248

~FEDERAL
COMMUNICA

TIONS LA W JO URNAL

[o.663
[Vol.

Applying this approach, the FCC rejected the Bureau's conclusion. While
recognizing that "flicking" was used "as an intensifier," it held that "given
the core meaning of the 'F-Word,' any use of that word or a variation, in
any context, inherently has a sexual connotation. 3 70 Thus, the term fell
within the definition of indecency. It added that: "The 'F-Word' is one of
the most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the
English language. Its use invariably invokes a coarse sexual image. The use
of the 'F-Word' here, on a nationally telecast awards ceremony, was
shocking and gratuitous." 7

CBS's Super Bowl Halfftime Show- "FleetingNudity"
About six months after the Golden Globe decision, the FCC issued an
NAL against CBS in the amount of $555,000 for the 2002 Super Bowl
A.

Halftime show in which Janet Jackson's breast was exposed. 7 CBS
contested liability, but under the Golden Globe test, the FCC found that
exposing a female breast depicted a sexual organ and thus fell within the
definition of indecency. 373 Moreover, it found the depiction patently
offensive because the
segment in question did not merely show a fleeting glimpse of a
woman's breast, as CBS presents it. Rather, it showed a man tearing
off a portion of a woman's clothing to reveal her naked breast during a
highly sexualized performance and while he sang "gonna have you

374
naked by the end of this song."
CBS sought review of the FCC 's ruling in the Third Circuit. 7

B.

Fox 's BillboardMusic Awards- "FleetingExpletives"

On the same day that the FCC fined CBS, it released an Omnibus
Order addressing multiple complaints about programs aired between 2002
and 2005.7 The Omnibus Order found ten programs indecent, issued
370. Id. at para. 8.
371. Id. at para. 9.
372. See Complaints Against Various TV Licensees Concerning Their Feb. 1, 2004,
Broadcast of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, Notice of Apparent Liability for
Forfeiture, 19 F.C.C.R. 19230 (2004) [hereinafter NAL]. The NAL states that the FCC
received over 542,000 complaints about this incident from members of the public. Id. at
19231 n.6.
373. Complaints Against Various TV Licensees Concerning Their Feb. 1, 2004
Broadcast of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, Forfeiture Order, 21 F.C.C.R.
2760, para. 9 (March 15, 2006), recon. denied, 21 F.C.C.R. 6653 (May 31, 2006).
374. Id. at para. 13.
375. CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008).
376. Complaints Regarding Various TV Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar. 8,
2005, Notices of Apparent Liability and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R.
2664 (2006) [hereinafter Omnibus Order]. On the same day, the FCC also issued an NAL
against CBS and its affiliates for broadcasting scenes of teenagers engaged in simulated sex
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NALs for six, and found that seventeen others did not violate § 1464."'~ The
FCC stated that "[tlaken both individually and as a whole, we believe that
[these rulings] will provide substantial guidance to broadcasters and the
public about the types of programming that are impermissible under our

indecency standard.

3

11

The Omnibus Order found that two programs broadcast on Fox
contained indecent content. One was the 2002 Billboard Music Awards
programs during which Cher said in her acceptance speech: "People have
3 79
been telling me I'm on the way out every year, right? So fuck 'em [SiC]."
The FCC found the fact that "flick" was not repeated was not dispositive
because use of that word in a "live broadcast of an awards ceremony when
children were expected to be in the audience, was shocking and
gratuitous. 380 The FCC applied a similar analysis to Fox's 2003 Billboard
Music Awards program, in which Nicole Richie used the words fucking
3 82
and shit.38 1 Fox sought review in the Second Circuit.

Although the networks argued in both Fox and CBS that the FCC's
actions were unconstitutional, the courts of appeals reversed the FCC on a
different ground-that the FCC had failed to adequately justify changing
its prior policy as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 8
The FCC sought certiorari in both cases. 8
In seeking Supreme Court review in Fox, the FCC argued that the
lower court's decision conflicted with the Court's decision in Pacifica
because it "criticized the Commission for taking context into account and
refusing to treat a single use of an expletive, no matter how graphic or
gratuitous, as per se not indecent, even though, in Pacifica, this Court
emphasized that 'context is all-important' in evaluating indecency. 8 In
acts during a 9:00 p.m. broadcast of Without a Trace. See Complaints Against Various TV
Licensees Concerning Their Dec. 31, 2004 Broadcast of the Program "Without a Trace,"
Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 21 F.C.C.R. 2732, para. 1 (2006).
377. Omnibus Order, supra note 376, at 2664-65.
378. Id. at para. 2.
379. Id. at para. 10 1 (internal quotation marks omi tted).
380. Id. at paras. 104-05.
381. Id. at paras. 114-17.
382. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d'444 (2d Cir. 2007). The FCC sought and
received a voluntary remand, but on remand sustained its earlier findings as to these two
programs. See Complaints Regarding Various TV Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002 and
Mar. 8, 2005, Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, para. 22 (2006).
383. Fox TV Stations, 489 F.3d at 462; CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 174-75 (3d
Cir. 2008).
384. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009)
(No. 07-582), 2007 WL 3231567; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, FCC v. CBS Corp., 129
S.Ct. 2176 (2008) (No. 08-653). 2008 WL 4933630.
385. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13-14, FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct.
1800 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2007 WL 3231567 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
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opposing review, NBC argued that the FCC's order was distinguishable
from and posed no conflict with Pacifica.11 6 Nonetheless, it urged that if
the Court took the case, it should overturn Pacifica because "there no
longer exists any sound basis for according broadcast speech less
protection than obtains in other channels of communication.""' 7 NBC
contended that
to the extent that Pacifica premised its distinction of the broadcast
medium from other channels of communication on the ...unique'
attributes of broadcasting,"-to wit, that broadcasts were, in 1978, "a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans" and were
"uniquely accessible to children" as compared to other types of
content,-it rests, thirty years later, on a moth-eaten foundation. In the
age of cable and satellite television and the Internet, broadcasting is
now one of many methods of delivering content to Americans in their
homes. Broadcast television, like other content in our media-driven
the Commission has
age, may be "pervasive," but in 2008, 38even
8
trouble contending that it is "uniquely" so.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 17, 2008 .~

VII. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN Fox AND THE DECISION
ON REMAND
The FCC's brief argued that its action in Fox was justified by
Pacifica, but that there was no need to reach the constitutional issues to
decide this case .390 Both Fox and NBC argued that the FCC's current
indecency regime was unconstitutional, but only NBC's brief focused on
the constitutional arguments .3 9 '1NBC argued that the FCC's definition of
indecency was virtually identical to language in the Communications
Decency Act, which the Court found unconstitutionally vague in Reno. 9
726, 750 (1978)). The FCC asserted that it had acted reasonably in determining that Cher's
and Richie's remarks constituted a "first blow" that could be redressed in the context in
which they were uttered. Id at 19.
386. See Brief in Opposition of NBC Universal, Inc. and NBC Telemundo License Co. at
23-26, Fox TV Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (No. 07-582) [hereinafter NBC Opp.).
387. Id. at 31.
388. Id. at 30-31 (citations omitted).
389. FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008). In its petition for certiorari in
CBS, the FCC noted the similarities between the cases and asked the Court to hold the
petition for certiorari in CBS pending its decision in the Fox case. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari for FCC at 14, FCC v. CBS, 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2008) (No. 08-653), 2008 WL
4933630.
390. See Brief for the Petitioners at 17, 43, FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct.
1800 (2009) (No. 07-582) [hereinafter FCC Br.].
391. For example, NBC asserted at the beginning of its brief, "This is a case about the
First Amendment." Brief of Respondents NBC Universal, Inc., NBC Telemundo License
Co., CBS Brdcst. Inc., and ABC, Inc. at 1, Fox TV Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (No. 07-582)
[hereinafter NBC Br.].
392. See id. at 21-23.
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NBC also argued that the FCC' s policy should be analyzed under strict
scrutiny rather than the lower standard applied in Pacifica, because
"[w]hatever validity these rationales may have had when this Court
articulated them decades ago, they rest today on moth-eaten foundations
and can no longer support the 'relaxed' scrutiny on which the
Commission's content restrictions have historically depended." 93 Because
of the widespread use of cable television, satellite services, and the
Internet, NBC argued that "over-the-air" broadcasting was no longer
"uniquely pervasive" or "uniquely accessible to children. 9
The Supreme CourtDecision
Of the nine Justices deciding Fox, only one was on the Court when it
decided Pacifica. Justice Stevens, then the newest Justice, had written the
decision for the Court affirming the FCC in Pacifica. Now Justice Stevens
was the most senior member of the Court, and he dissented in Fox.39
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. 196 The Court did not
address whether Pacifica remained good law or whether the FCC's action
was constitutional. Instead, it reversed the lower court's conclusion that the
FCC had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 9
The Second Circuit had reversed the FCC, finding that the APA
required a more substantial explanation was required when an agency
changed course. The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of the
APA, holding that neither the APA nor State Farm required that changes in
policy be subjected to more searching review. 38The Court found that the

A.

393. Id. at 32. See also Brief for Respondent Fox TV Stations, Inc. at 43-45, Fox TV
Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (No. 07-582) (arguing that the evolution of the contemporary
media marketplace has eroded Pacifica's premises) [hereinafter Fox Br.].
394. See NBC Br., supra note 391, at 33-35.
395. See Fox TVStations, 129 S. Ct. at 1824 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
396. Only one section of Justice Scalia's opinion did not receive five votes. Justice
Kennedy did not join in Part III-E, which responded to arguments made in the dissents. His
separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment explained that he agreed
with Justice Breyer that the agency must explain why it now rejects the considerations that
led it to adopt the initial policy. However, because the FCC's Order explained that the FCC
had changed its reading of Pacifica, its explanation was adequate. See id. at 1822-24
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
397. Id. at 1819.
398. Id. at 1810. State Farmn refers to Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). There, the Court explained that
The scope of review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard is narrow and a
court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Nevertheless, the
agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for
its action including a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice
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FCC acknowledged that it was changing its policy and had given sufficient
explanation for the change.3 9
Although the Second Circuit reversed the FCC on APA grounds
alone, it expressed skepticism that the FCC could "provide a reasoned
explanation for its 'fleeting expletive' regime that would pass constitutional
"interest of judicial economy," it offered several pages of
muster.40 In the
"4observations."40 ' First, the Second Circuit expressed sympathy with the
networks' "contention that the FCC's indecency test is undefined,
02
indiscernible, inconsistent, and consequently, unconstitutionally vague.4
It noted that even though the FCC had declared that all variants of luck and
shit were presumptively indecent, the FCC had found that the repeated use
of those words in Saving Private Ryan was not indecent. 0
The Second Circuit court also noted "some tension in the law
regarding the appropriate level of First Amendment scrutiny," in that the
Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny when evaluating the regulation of
indecency on cable television and the Internet, but applied intermediate
scrutiny to broadcasting because of "unique considerations." 04 The
networks argued that the grounds for treating broadcasting differently had
eroded over time. The Second Circuit seemed to agree, noting that "we
would be remiss not to observe that it is increasingly difficult to describe
the broadcast media as uniquely pervasive and uniquely accessible to
children, and at some point in the future, strict scrutiny may properly apply
in the context of regulating broadcast television."A0 5 The Supreme Court,
however, declined to address the constitutional claims, noting that the
made." In reviewing that explanation, we must "consider whether the decision
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a
clear error of judgment." Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and
capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,
or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise. The reviewing court should not attempt itself to make
up for such deficiencies: "We may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's
action that the agency itself has not given." We will, however, "uphold a decision
of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned."
Id. (citations omitted).
399. Id. at 1819.
400. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 462 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd, FCC v. Fox
TV Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
40 1. Id. at 462-66.
402. Id. at 463.
403. See id (citing Complaints Against Various TV Licensees Regarding Their
Broadcast on Nov. 11, 2004, of the ABC TV Network's Presentation of the Film "Saving
Private Ryan," Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4507, para. 14 (2005)).
404. Fox TV Stations, 489 F.3d at 464.
405. Id. at 465.
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constitutionality "will be determined soon enough, perhaps in this very
06
case."4A
Although not deciding constitutionality, the majority opinion did rely
on Pacifica. For example, it noted that Pacifica held that "the First
Amendment allowed Carlin's monologue to be banned in light of the
'uniquely pervasive presence' of the medium and the fact that broadcast
programming is 'uniquely accessible to children."4'" Following Pacfica,
the FCC had "preserved a distinction between literal and nonliteral (or
'expletive') uses of evocative language. 0 The FCC changed this view in
its 2004 decision in the Golden Globe case, where it clarified that "the
mere fact that specific words or phrases are not sustained or repeated does
not mandate a finding that material that is otherwise patently offensive to
09
the broadcast medium is not indecent."
The majority found that the FCC's decision in Fox "to look at the
patent offensiveness of even isolated uses of sexual and excretory words
fits with the context-based approach we sanctioned in Pacifica.41 0 In
response to the lower court's finding that the FCC acted arbitrarily because
it lacked evidence of harm from fleeting expletives, the majority observed
that Pacificahad not required any quantitative measure of harm. It added:
we have never held that Pacifica represented the outer limits of
permissible regulation, so that fleeting expletives may not be
forbidden. To the contrary, we explicitly left for another day whether
"an occasional expletive" in "a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy"
could be prohibited. By using the narrowness of Pacifica's holding to
require empirical evidence of harm before the Commission regulates
more broadly, the broadcasters attempt to turn the sword of Pacifica,
which allowed some regulation of broadcast indecency, into an
administrative-law shield preventing any regulation beyond what
Pacifica sanctioned.4 1

Justice Thomas concurred, agreeing that the FCC had complied with
the APA. 412 But he argued that the precedents cited to support the FCC'_s
406. FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009). The Court was likely
referring to the fact that even though the Second Circuit decided the case solely on
administrative procedure grounds, it provided an extensive analysis of the constitutional
challenges and expressed skepticism that the FCC could "provide a reasoned explanation for
its 'fleeting expletive' regime that would pass constitutional muster." Fox TV Stations, 489
F.3d at 462.
407. Fox TV Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1806 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
748-49 (1978)).
408. Fox TV Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1807.
409. Id. at 1808 (quoting Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding
Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19
F.C.C.R. 4975, para. 12 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
410. Fox TVStations, 129 S. Ct. at 1812.
411. Id. at 1815 (citations omitted).
412. Id at 1820 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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constitutional authority-Red Lion and Paciflea- "were unconvincing
when they were issued, and the passage of time has only increased doubt
regarding their continued validity."4 3 He contended that "Red Lion
adopted, and Pacifica reaffirmed, a legal rule that lacks any textual basis in
the Constitution. '"1 Moreover, even if these cases could have been
justified at the time, "traditional broadcast television and radio are no
longer the 'uniquely pervasive' media forms they once e.'1
Justice Stevens dissented, as did Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer,
who was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Justice Stevens
argued that the maj.ority "incorrectly assum[ed]" that Pacifica endorsed a
construction of the term "indecent" that "permits the FCC to punish the
broadcast of any expletive that has a sexual or excretory origin," when in
fact, "Pacifica was not so sweeping, and the Commission's changed view
of its statutory mandate certainly would have been rejected if presented to
the Court at the time."4 16 Stevens described the Paciflca decision, which he
wrote, as upholding
the FCC's adjudication that a 12 minute [sic], expletive-filled
monologue by satiric humorist George Carlin was indecent "as
broadcast." We did not decide whether an isolated expletive could
qualify as indecent. And we certainly did not hold that any41word
with a
7
sexual or scatological origin, however used, was indecent.
Stevens noted a "critical distinction between the use of an expletive to
describe a sexual or excretory function and . . . to express an emotion ,,418
Because the FCC adopted an interpretation of indecency bearing no
resemblance to what Paciflea contemplated with no "awareness that it has
ventured far beyond Paeiflea's reading of § 1464," he found the FCC
decision arbitrary. 1 Justice Ginsburg agreed that the FCC's "bold stride
beyond the bounds" of Paeifiea was arbitrary and capricious. 2 She noted
that Paciflea was "tightly cabined, and for good reason," and that Justice
2
Brennan's concerns about suppression were "even more potent today.",4 1
413. Id.

414. Id.at 1821.
415. Id. at 1822. Justice Thomas noted that most consumers received broadcast media
via cable or satellite and that it was also available on computers, cell phones, and other
wireless devices. Id.
416. Id. at 1825 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens also dissented on the grounds that the
majority treated the FCC's rulemaking authority as a "species of executive power" that need
not be explained. Id.
417. Id at 1827 (citations omitted).
418. Id.
419. Id. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
420. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
421. Id. at 1829. Justice Breyer also faulted the FCC for failing to acknowledge that an
entirely different understanding of Pacflica supported its earlier policy. Id. at 1834 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
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After deciding the Fox case, the Supreme Court granted the petition
for writ of certiorari in CBS, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the
Third Circuit for further consideration in light of its decision in Fox.42

B.

The Fox Decision on Remand

After further briefing, the same panel of the Second Circuit
unanimously found the FCC's indecency policy to be unconstitutionally
vague.4 2 It rejected the FCC's claim that it needed a flexible standard
because broadcasters had found ways to air indecent material without using
the "seven dirty words," noting that "[i]f the FCC cannot anticipate what
will be considered indecent under its policy, then it can hardly expect

broadcasters to do

so.""424

The court also found there was "little rhyme or

reason" to the FCC's cases regarding the use of fuck and shit, thus leaving
broadcasters to guess as to whether an expletive would be subject to an
exception or not."2 It concluded that the FCC' s "indiscernible standards"
created an unacceptable risk that they would be enforced in a
426
discriminatory manner.
The court rejected the FCC's contention that its context-based
approach was consistent with or even required by Pacifica:
While Pacifica emphasized the importance of context in regulating
indecent broadcasts, it did so in order to emphasize the limited scope
of its holding, finding that the particular "context" of the Carlin
monologue justified an intrusion on broadcasters rights under the First
Amendment. It does not follow that the FCC can justify any decision
to sanction indecent speech by citing "context." Of course, context is
always relevant, and we do not mean to suggest otherwise in this
opinion. But the FCC still must have discernible standards by which
individual contexts are judged."2
At the same time, the court declined the networks' invitation to
overrule Pacifica. It agreed with the networks that the "past thirty years
ha[ve] seen an explosion of media sources, and broadcast television has

become only one voice in the chorus.,"' 28 It also recognized that the
technological changes such as the V-Chip had provided parents with
greater ability to decide what their children can watch .4 29 However, it
concluded that "we are bound by Supreme Court precedent, regardless of

422. FCC v. CBS, 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009).
423. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010).
424. Idat331.
425. Idat332.
426. Id
427. Id at 333 (citations omitted).
428. Idat326.
429. Id. 328.
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VIII. CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF PA4CIFICA FOR THE
CURRENT CONTROVERSY OVER BROADCAST INDECENCY
From today's vantage point, it seems surprising that the Supreme
Court took the Pacifica case and upheld the FCC's position. The FCC had
received only a single complaint about the broadcast of the Carlin
monologue. While finding that the broadcast violated § 1468, the FCC
merely admonished the station. As one article put it, the "FCC's response
was tantamount to the proverbial principal telling the child upon his first
3
offense that 'this will go on your permanent record. ,,4 1
The FCC intentionally utilized a Declaratory Order to provide
guidance to broadcasters as to what language would be tolerated on the
public airwaves when children were in the audience. The D.C. Circuit
reversed, with Judge Leventhal dissenting. In its attempt to reverse the D.C.
Circuit in the Supreme Court, the FCC recast its action as a narrow, factbased adjudication.
Many observers expected that the FCC would lose in the Supreme
Court. The United States, in fact, argued that the FCC's action violated the
First Amendment. The position was,' set forth by an experienced Supreme
Court advocate from the Solicitor General's office. In contrast, the FCC
counsel had never argued before in the Supreme Court and had difficulty
answering the questions at oral argument. When the case was decided, it
was harshly criticized by many in the public and in academia.
My review of the available papers from the Justices that heard the
case reveal just how close the decision was. Justice Stevens provided the
swing vote, stating at the conference that he had flip-flopped and might do
so again. He had a difficult time getting five votes for his opinion. Justices
Blackmun and Powell both rejected the advice of their law clerks and
joined most of Justice Stevens's opinion. The four other Justices dissented,
with Justice Brennan writing a particularly blistering dissent on First
Amendment grounds.
My review of the Justices' papers suggests that one of the factors
leading to the Court's narrow affirmance of the FCC was the dissenting
opinion of Judge Leventhal in the decision below. Leventhal was a highly
respected jurist. He thought that the only issue before the court was the
narrow question of the reasonableness of the FCC's finding with regard to
430. Id at 327. The FCC filed a Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc on Aug.
25, 2010. It is "widely expected" that the case will go back to the Supreme Court.
Associated Press, FCC Asks Court to Revisit a Ruling Against an Indecency Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2010, at B2.
43 1. Demas, supra note 347, at 40.
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WBAI's broadcast of the Carlin monologue in the afternoon. The repeated
references to Leventhal in the notes of Justices Blackmnun and Powell and
in the post-argument conference suggest that several members of the
Supreme Court were swayed by Leventhal's framing of the case.
It is somewhat ironic, then, that the Declaratory Order in Pacifica
came to be understood as a prohibition on the broadcast of the "seven dirty

words" prior to 10:00 p.m. 432 However, the fact that it was not an actual
rule and the narrowness of the Supreme Court's holding permitted the FCC
to change its policy without conducting a rulemaking. That is exactly what
the FCC did in Golden Globe, Fox, and CBS. Moreover, it justified its new
approach by asserting that under Pacifica, it was necessary for the FCC to
consider the context of the allegedly indecent broadcast. In reviewing the
Fox decision, however, the Supreme Court applied the same standard of
review it uses for rulemaking.
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit has
concluded that the FCC's approach to indecency in Fox was
unconstitutionally vague. It is uncertain whether the FCC will seek
certiorari of the Second Circuit's decision on remand in Fox, and if so,
whether the Court will take the case. If the Court hears the case, it will be
decided by a completely different bench than the one that decided Pacfica.
Justice Stevens retired at the end of the 2009-10 term and has been
replaced by Justice Elena Kagan.
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court in Pacfica, but he
dissented in Fox, arguing that the FCC's actions in Fox went well beyond
and were not supported by the decision in Pacifica. The history of the
Pacifica decision supports Justice Stevens's position that Pacifica did not
contemplate-much less mandate-the FCC' s findings of indecency in the
Fox and CBS cases. Neither the FCC nor the Court analyzed the content of
the WVBAI's "Lunchpail" in the manner that the FCC analyzed the Super
Bowl Halftime Show or the Billboard Music Awards programs. To the
contrary, many at the time criticized the failure to take context into
account. 3 Had the FCC considered the context of the program in which
the language was used in Pacifica, it would have been difficult for it to
have reached the result it did. WBAI compared Carlin to Mark Twain and
argued that the monologue was broadcast as part of a serious discussion on
the use of language and that he used "dirty words" to make fun of society's
attitudes toward language. 3 And indeed, four days before his death in June
2008, George Carlin was named recipient of the Mark Twain Prize for
432. See Levi, supra note 363, at 1.
433. See, e.g., supra notes 94, 123, 223 and accompanying text.
434. Brief for FCC at 16-17, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-528)
(quoting Pacifica's Response to the complaint).
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American Humor.43
However, there is another, perhaps more important lesson to be drawn
from the history of the Pacfica case: individual adjudications, such as
those in Fox and CBS, are not good vehicles for setting forth policy with
regard to broadcast indecency.
Generally, the FCC announces new policies or changes existing
policies after conducting notice and comment rulemaking under section
553 of the Administrative Procedure Act.4 3 In contrast, the Pacifica case
involved the adjudication of a single complaint. The FCC also used
complaints about specific programs to announce broad new rules regulating
indecency. On review, both the Second and Third Circuits applied
rulemaking standards to the FCC's adjudications, finding that the FCC had
failed to comply with the APA and State Farm, a case that involved a
rulemaking proceeding. 4 37 The Supreme Court also applied the State Farm
test, but the majority concluded that the FCC was consistent with the APA
requirements. 3
Both the majority and dissents viewed the FCC's ruling against Fox
as the equivalent of adopting a new rule. For example, the majority
explained that State Farm, "which involved the rescission of a prior
regulation, said only that such action requires 'a reasoned analysis for the
change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in
the first instance."' 4A39 Justice Stevens criticized the majority for assuming
that the FCC's "rulemaking authority is a species of executive power," and
that it "need not explain its decision to discard a longstanding rule in favor
of a dramatically different approach to regulation." 40 Justice Breyer's
dissent noted that the "result" of the FCC's action was "a rule that may
well chill coverage.""41 He acknowledged that the FCC did not use
"traditional administrative notice-and-comment procedures," which would
have "obligate[d] the FCC to respond to all significant comments, for the
opportunity to comment is meaningless unless the agency responds to
significant points raised by the public."" 2' But he concluded that
the same failures here-where the policy is important, the significance
435. The Kennedy Center presents this annual award to recognize lifetime achievement

by an outstanding comedian. Jacqueline Trescott, Bleep! Bleep! George Carlin to Receive
Mark Twain Humor Prize, WASH. POST, June 18, 2008, at Cl1.
436. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
437. CBS v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 174, 182-83, 188-89 (3d Cur. 2008); Fox TV Stations,
Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 455, 457 (2d Cir. 2007).
438. FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1823-24 (2009).
439. Id at 1810.
440. Id. at 1824-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
441. Id. at 1837 (Breyer, J., disssenting) (emphasis added).
442. Id
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of the issues clear, the failures near complete-should lead us to the
same conclusion. The agency's failure to discuss these two "important
aspect[s] of the problem" means that the resulting decision is
"'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion"' requiring us to remand
3
the matter to the agency.""A
If the FCC wants to continue enforcing § 1468's prohibition against
broadcast indecency, the history of the Pacifica case suggests that the FCC
would have greater success by initiating a rulemaking proceeding than by
seeking certiorari in Fox. The benefits of rulemaking over case-by-case
adjudication are well known. Rulemakings are said to produce higher
quality rules because in an adjudication, only the party or parties to the
particular dispute are before the agency. By contrast, in a rulemaking
proceeding, all potentially affected members of the public have the
opportunity to participate. The comments filed in a rulemaking typically
provide diverse perspectives, address the nature and extent of the problem,
provide factual information, and identify practical problems with the
agency proposals.""4
Pacifica illustrates the drawbacks of making policy by adjudication.
The entire defense fell on the shoulders of the Pacifica Foundation, a
nonprofit organization with limited resources. The record in Pacifica,
which essentially consisted of two short letters, contained few facts even
about the specific complaint, and nothing about the impact on other
broadcasters, the listening public, or speakers, creators, or producers of the
work being broadcast. As a result, the FCC Commissioners, as well as the
judges and Justices who heard the case, made factual assumptions that may
not have been correct. For example, the FCC assumed without citing any

evidence that children would be listening to the radio at 2:00

p.m."45

Yet,

data submitted in amicus briefs suggested that few children listened to the
radio at 2:00 p.m., while large numbers listened in the late evening
hours." Had the FCC conducted a rulemaking proceeding in which it
sought information about the listening habits of children, it might have
reached a better decision."
443. Id. at 1838 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).

444. See, e.g., 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.8 (4th ed.
2002).
445. Pacifica did not submit such information, and in fact, it may not have had access to
such data. Although ratings and demographic information are essential to commercial radio
stations for purposes of advertising, noncommercial radio stations do not need such data
because they do not sell advertising time. Moreover, such data is not publically available
and is expensive to purchase.
446. Open Media Br., supra note 78, at 12-13; ABC Br., supra note 140, at 9.
Participating as an amicus after an agency decision has been made is not as effective as
being able to present arguments and facts to the agency before it decides.
447. Judge Bazelon's opinion identified several other undocumented assumptions,
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Similarly, the adjudication in Fox left important gaps in the factual
record. For example, Breyer's dissenting opinion faulted the FCC for
failing to consider the ruling's impact on small and public broadcasters,
who, because they could not afford the cost of "bleeping" technology,
would curtail their coverage of local public events." 8' Had the FCC
conducted a rulemaking, it could have obtained and submitted evidence on
the cost and impact of this technology.
Rules make it easier for entities subject to regulation to ascertain what
is or is not allowed and thus reduce the ability of the agency to engage in
discretionary enforcement."49 The FCC's declaratory ruling in Pacifica did
not put broadcasters on notice as to what they could and could not say on
air, but only that they could not repeatedly broadcast the "seven dirty
words" at times when children were likely to be in the audience. And it left
the FCC free to bring later enforcement actions citing Pacifica, such as
those in Fox and CBS, even though those cases were factually distinct.
Although the FCC claimed that the Omnibus Order in Fox provided
guidance to broadcasters, even a broadcaster who read the entire Order
would not have a clear idea of what the FCC considered indecent. Indeed,
the Second Circuit reached the same conclusion on remand when it found
the FCC's policy "impermissibly vague." 4 10 Thus, the FCC's chance of
adopting a constitutional indecency policy would be increased by
abandoning its case-by-case approach and conducting a rulemaking
proceeding.

including whether parents would find such language unsuitable for children and whether
parents had other ways to control the listening habits of their children. Pacifica Found. v.
FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, J., dissenting). Justice Powell thought the
language was "'.patently offensive' to most people regardless of age." FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 757 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Brennan pointed out that
"some parents may actually find Mr. Carlin's unabashed attitude towards the seven 'dirty
words' healthy, and deem it desirable to expose their children to the manner in which Mr.
Carlin defuses the taboo surrounding the words." Id. at 770 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Had
the FCC conducted a rulemaking proceeding instead of acting on a single complaint, parents
or organizations representing parents may have weighed in on these issues.
448. FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1832-38 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). The CBS case presented a similar issue involving the cost of video delays.
449. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 444, at 372-73.
450. The court illustrates how the FCC's indecency policy is impermissibly vague with
an example: "[Tlhe FCC concluded that 'bullshit' in a 'NYPD Blue' episode was patently
offensive, [but] it concluded that 'dick' and 'dickhead' were not." Fox TV Stations, Inc. v.
FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 330 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Omnibus Order, supra note 376, paras. 12728).

